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LIMITING LIABILITY IN PUBLIC
ACCOUNTING SUITS: A DESPERATE APPEAL
FROM A BELEAGUERED PROFESSION
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the past two years, plaintiffs have filed a staggering number of suits
against public accountants.' A significant number of the cases filed against
certified public accountants involve alleged Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) violations, fraud, and negligence.2 A large proportion of the current
1. E.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. First Republic Bank Corp., 806 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Tex.
1992); Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992); In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 802
F. Supp. 804 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 822 S.W.2d 592
(Tenn. 1991); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992); SEC
v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); U.S. Nat'l Bank v. Miniscribe Corp.,
No. 89-CV-1031-A (Tex. Dist. Ct., Galveston Co., 1992); Standard Chartered PLC v. Price
Waterhouse, No. 88-34414 (Ariz. Super. Ct., Maricopa Co. 1992); In re American Continental
Corp./Lincoln Sav. and Loan See. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424 (D.C. Ariz. 1992); Ades v. Deloitte
& Touche, Nos. 90 Civ. 4959 (RWS), 90 Civ. 5056 (RWS), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8978
(S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1991); Lyne v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 772 F. Supp. 1064 (N.D. Ill. 1991);
Shaabanv. Arthur Andersen& Co., No. 91 C 7539, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5437 (N.D. Ill. March
24, 1992); Hydroculture, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, No. I Ca-CV 90-381, 1992 Ariz. App.
LEXIS 255 (Ariz. Ct. App. filed Sept. 17, 1992); In re Control Data Corp. Sec. Litig., 933 F.2d
616 (8th Cir. 1991); Farlow v. Peat Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1992);
Ligon v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 957 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1992); Congregation of the Passion,
Holy Cross Province v. Touche Ross & Co., 586 N.E.2d 600 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
An estimated $30 billion in damage claims currently face the entire public accounting
profession. Another indicator of the number of suits being brought is the amount paid by the six
largest accounting firms in total expenditures for defending lawsuits. In 1991, the total expenditure
for settling and defending lawsuits was $477 million, which was up from the 1990 figure of $404
million. ARTHUR ANDERSEN E7 AL., THE LIABILITY CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES: IMPACT ON
THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION, A STATEMENT OF POSITION 2, 3 (Aug. 6, 1992). The accountant
liability crisis has expanded to include international suits. The Australian government indicated that
they have filed a $750 million suit against KPMG Peat Marwick for deficiencies in a 1988 audit of
a government owned merchant bank, Tricontinental Corporation. Australian Government Wallops
Peat with $750M Suit, ACCT. TODAY, Aug. 24, 1992, at 15. "A public accountant may be defined
as an independent professional person who holds himself out as an expert in accounting theory and
practice." RUFUS WIXON Elr AL., ACCOUNTANTS' HANDBOOK 26-1 (5th ed. 1970).
2. In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 802 F. Supp. at 804; Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. at
1217; In re Control Data Corp. Sec. Litig., 933 F.2d at 616; Farlow, 956 F.2d at 982; In re
American Continental Corp., 794 F. Supp. at 1424.
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public accounting suits are filed in attempts to reach the "deep pocket."' To
assure judgment collection in a suit, a plaintiff will search for any solvent
defendant with a deep pocket; in many cases, this is the certified public
accountant (CPA).'
Another recent phenomenon involves plaintiffs filing unwarranted suits
strictly to coerce settlements for staggering dollar amounts.' Despite the
Plaintiffs have sued one out of twelve New York Stock Exchange companies in the past three
years. A National Law Journal study and report showed that out of 46 cases, 12 were filed within
one day after a company disclosed less-than-anticipated earnings. Similarly, another 30 cases were
filed within one week of disclosure. Senator Domenici, Introductory Statement, Remarks on S.
3181, Securities Private EnforcementAct of 1992, at 2, 3 (Aug. 12, 1992). In 1990 and 1991, 614
class action security cases were filed in federal courts against American companies. Senator
Sanford, Introductory Statement, Remarks on S. 3181, Securities Private Enforcement Act of 1992,
at 1 (Aug. 12, 1992).
A staggering number of securities suits are brought against accounting firms because of the
potential for holding the CPA firm liable for the full cost of the business failure. John Pickering,
New Bills Promise Litigation Relief, ACcT. TODAY, Aug. 24, 1992, at 2.
3. ANDERSEN Er AL., supra note 1, at 2, 4. For examples and discussions of cases supporting
the theory that many public accounting cases are filed to reach a deep pocket, see John H. Cushman,
$400 Million Paid by S&L Auditors, Settling U.S. Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1992, at Al; Susan
Schmidt, Ernst & Young Pays $400 Million to Settle Thrift Regulators' Claims, WASH. POST, Nov.
24, 1992, at A 1; Suzanne Woolley & Zachary Schiller, These White Shoes are Splattered With Mud,
Bus. WK., Sept. 7, 1992, at 32. For examples indicating the possible plaintiffs' use of the deep
pocket theory, see the following cases: Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 967 F.2d at 166; Bily, 834 P.2d
at 745; Miniscribe, No. 89-CV-1031-A; Standard Chartered PLC, No. 88-34414. See generally
AUS Consultants, The Economic Effects of Scapegoat Litigation, at i (July 31, 1992) (study prepared
for The American Tort Reform Association).
4. Accountants are named as co-defendants in litigation not because they engaged in deliberate
fraud, but because they are able to pay large judgments. Long-Awaited Liability Reforms Bill
Introduced, PRACTICING CPA, Sept. 1992, at 3. Plaintiffs tend to go after the deep pocket defendant
in part due to the law ofjoint and several liability. In a state that imposesjoint and several liability,
the CPA firm is stuck paying the entire judgment, regardless of its percentage of fault. ANDERSEN
Er AL., supra note 1, at 1, 6.
For an example of a court's recent affirmation of the doctrine of comparative negligence, see
McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992). See also AUS Consultants, supra note 3, for
information gathered in a study supporting the deep pocket theory of recovery.
5. ANDERSEN ElT AL., supra note 1, at 1-3. A few recent public accounting settlement cases
include Ernst & Young settling for $41 million and Coopers & Lybrand settling for $20 million.
A related issue involves holding attorney firms liable in third-party liability actions. The firm of
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler recently paid a settlement fee of $41 million. Cushman,
supra note 3, at Al.
Ernst & Young recently agreed to one of the largest settlements in the history of public
accounting suits. Ernst agreed to pay $400 million for its involvement in the failed S&L scandal.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), ResolutionTrust Corporation (RTC), and Office
of Thrift Supervision (OTS) agreed to the settlement. Schmidt, supra note 3, at Al.
Coopers & Lybrand settled a case brought by bondholders of Miniscribe Corporation for an
estimated $40 million in February 1992. Woolley & Schiller, supra note 3, at 32. Coopers &
Lybrand was ordered to pay Miniscribe investors $200 million in punitive damages in February of
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increase in professional negligence cases against attorneys, it appears the legal
profession is promoting the filing of suspect cases.6 Unable to afford the costs
of either initial or extended litigation, many public accounting firms are opting
to settle out of court.7 Although many firms may be innocent of the charges
1992. Paul Geoghan, Punitive Damages: A Storm Over the Accounting Profession, J. AccT., July
1992, at 46. For more information about the Miniscribe case and Coopers' settlement, see infra
notes 23-27 and accompanying text. For an additional supporting case showing the out-of-court
settlement inducement, see infra notes 10-20 and accompanying text.
For information on past accounting litigation trends, compare the cases referred to above with
DENZIL Y. CAUSEY, JR., DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTs 2 n.8 (1979).
Investors and creditors filed about 100 lawsuits against public accounting firms in 1966. The
settlement fees in public accounting suits in the 1970s were substantially lower than the fees
currently paid by CPA firms. The December 1970 Fortune magazine reported that Lybrand, Ross
Bros. & Montgomery (Coopers & Lybrand) paid $4,950,00 in settlement fees to shareholders and
creditors of an insolvent financial company. CAUSEY, supra, at 2. The July 1978 Journal of
Accountancy listed five accounting firms paying $44 million in settlement amounts, three firms
paying $39 million, and Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. paying $1.5 million in settlement fees. In
1977, the largest civil verdict against an accounting firm was $30 million. Id. Other settlements
reported in the early and mid 1970s included a $400,000 settlement by Haskins & Sells, an $875,000
settlement by Arthur Andersen, a $950,000 settlement by Arthur Young & Co., and a $1.3 million
settlement by Coopers & Lybrand. Id.
6. See AUS Consultants, supra note 3, at 1, 3, 6; ANDERSEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 2. For
a general discussion of the Savings & Loan (S&L) impact on attorneys, see Steve France, The S&L
Mess; When the '80s Meet the '90s, A.B.A. J., May, 1991, at 52. An advertisement by a Virginia
law firm which read, "Losses in the financial or stock markets? You may have a legal remedy,"
demonstrates how the legal profession continues to promote a litigious society. Domenici, supra
note 2, at 2. For a more thorough discussion of how attorneys are feeding the fire regarding
accountants' third-party liability crisis, see id.
7. Interview with Mr. Michael Crandall, CPA, Principal of Siegfried, Crandall, Vos & Lewis,
P.C., in Kalamazoo, Michigan (October 10, 1992) [hereinafter Crandall Interview]. See also
ANDERSEN Er AL., supra note 1, at 3, 4; Domenici, supra note 2, at 2-4.
Lawsuits Decline, but Settlements Skyrocket
1990 1991 1992
Audit Related Litigation
Number of suits files 192 172 141
Total amount of awards and
settlements paid $89.6m $160.3m $752.4m
Amount of awards and settlements
per audit partner $19,865 $37,900 $185,737
Number of cases settled 52 67 115
Amount of settlements $54.4m $146.6m $748.3m
Number of cases dismissed 23 29 79
Number of cases tried 9 7 15
Number of verdicts for defendants 3 3 12
Number of verdicts for plaintiffs 6 4 3
Total amount of award to plaintiffs $35.2m $13.7m $4.1m
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brought against them, the high cost of litigation and the fear of disproportionate
jury awards outweigh the benefits of maintaining the CPA firm's reputation and
publicly vindicating itself.'
Two recent cases demonstrate how the current legal system and laws
regarding the expansion of third-party liability in public accounting cases are
producing inequitable results.9 In the first case, Standard Chartered Bank
(Standard), a British company, brought suit against Price Waterhouse, a public
accounting firm.'0 Standard purchased United Bank of Arizona for fifteen
Accounting and Audit Practice Protection Costs
Gross accounting and audit revenue $5,257m $5,319m $5,470m
Costs of judgments, settlements
and legal defense $367m $485m $783m
Gross costs as a percent of A&A
revenue 7% 9.1% 14.3%
Insurance premiums net of
insurance recoveries $37m ($8m) ($185m)
Net audit practice protection
costs $404m $477m $595m
Net costs as percentage of
revenue 7.7% 9% 10.9%
Average earnings per Big Six
partner $206,000 $190,000 $212,000
Source Accountants Coalition, Washington, D.C. (Big Six Report to SEC)
m= millions
Footnotes, AccT. TODAY, Jan. 24, 1994, at 2.
8. Crandall Interview, supra note 7; ANDERSEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 2-4. See also
Cushman, supra note 3; Schmidt, supra note 3; Philip A. Lacovara, 'Follow he Money; Should
Lawyers and Accountants Pay For the Sins of Their Clients?, WASH. POST, July 21, 1992, at A19.
For the effects of punitive damages on the high cost of litigation and out-of-court settlements, see
Geoghan, supra note 5.
9. Third-party liability involves a third-party to an action who alleges injury from the
defendant's intentional or unintentional conduct. For a discussion of the broad theory behind third-
party liability in a negligence action, see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 284-300 (5th ed. 1984). One of the first cases to deal with third-party liability in
negligence cases was Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
10. Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse, No. 88-34414 (Ariz. Super. Ct., Maricopa
Co. 1992). In 1985, a change in Arizona banking investment laws caused a large number of out-of-
state financial institutions to buy Arizona banks. In Arizona, prior to 1985, out-of-state financial
institutions were prohibited from purchasing local commercial banks. In 1985, this law was changed
to allow out-of-state purchases of in-state banks. Standard Chartered chose to capitalize on the
newly opened market by purchasing United Bank of Arizona. United Bank of Arizona, the fourth
largest bank in the state, with $2.2 billion in assets and a net worth of $130 million, appeared to be
a sound investment in 1985. Unfortunately, Standard's enthusiasm caused it to conduct a limited
survey of United's loan portfolio. Philip R. Lochner, Jr., Black Days for Accounting Firms, J.
ACCT., Aug. 1992, at 105.
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times United's earnings." After Standard acquired United, some of United's
real estate loans proved unprofitable. 2 United's shaky financial position
together with Standard's unstable loan portfolio caused Standard to sell United
for a huge loss. 13
Standard, anxious to recoup its losses, looked for a viable target to
compensate it for its investment lOSS. 14  After determining that United's
shareholders would not be possible targets because of their physical dispersement
across the country, Standard was left with only one other involved actor with a
deep pocket, Price Waterhouse. 5 Price Waterhouse performed United's audits
for the two-year time period leading up to Standard's acquisition. 6 Standard
alleged that Price Waterhouse negligently performed its audits and that Price
should have discovered the overstatement of United's actual net worth." Price
Waterhouse blamed Standard for not conducting its own investigation of the
bank prior to purchase and argued that the firm was not engaged to review
United's loan portfolio before Standard purchased United. 8 The Arizona jury
awarded Standard $338 million in damages, 1,000 times the accounting fees that
11. Lochner, supra note 10, at 105. Standard Chartered actually paid $335 million for United
Bank. Id. Standard acquired United after a year-long study and without waiting for Price
Waterhouse to issue its final audit. One of United's portfolio problems was its loan-loss reserves.
Price Wins New Trial In Arizona Bank Case, AccT. TODAY, Jan. 4, 1993, at 2.
12. Lochner, supra note 10, at 105. In the trial, Standard's biggest contention specifically
involved two of the bank's largest loans, which produced an aftertax charge of approximately $17
million. Michael Bradford, Auditors Fear Liability; Price Waterhouse Hit by $338 Million Award,
BUS. INS., May 25, 1992, at 2.
13. Lochner, supra note 10, at 106. Concerned with Standard's third world portfolio, U.K.
regulators were pressuring Standard to improve its capital base. Id. See Lacovara, supra note 8,
at A19 (discussing the jury award in Standard and similar cases and their potential effects on the
economic structure). Standard's reported loss on the United investment was an alleged $207 million.
Price Wins New Trial in Arizona Bank Case, supra note 11, at 2. Citicorp bought United from
Standard in June, 1988, for $208 million. Kerry Fehr, Judge Voids $338 Million Jury Verdict,
PHOENIX GAZETTE, Dec. 17, 1992, at Al. United was not a savings & loan, and consequently,
Standard's sale was not the result of its failure; rather, one reason for its sale was marked by the
United Bank of England applying pressure to Standard to raise its capital ratios in late 1987. Larry
Black, Price Waterhouse to pay $338Mfor Audit, INDEPENDENT, May 21, 1992, at 28.
14. Lochner, supra note 10, at 106.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. In addition to alleging that Price Waterhouse's audits were negligently performed,
Standard alleged that Price's staff was insufficiently trained and supervised and that United possessed
inadequate internal controls. Id.
18. Fehr, supra note 13, at Al. Standard did not wait for one of Price's last audits before
closing the deal with United. Id.
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Price Waterhouse charged on Standard's audits.'9
The Standard case demonstrates how plaintiffs can selectively sue
defendants with deep pockets and make a profit.' A collateral problem to the
deep pocket syndrome is plaintiffs suing public accounting firms to induce out-
of-court settlements. 21 The second case, U.S. National Bank v. Miniscribe
Corp. ,22 clearly demonstrates a combination of the deep pocket syndrome and
the expansion of unwarranted suits filed to induce settlement.
In Miniscribe, bondholders of a failed computer disk-drive manufacturer,
Miniscribe Corporation, filed a malpractice suit alleging that Cooiiers &
Lybrand (Coopers) had conspired to overstate Miniscribe's financial
condition.' Miniscribe's former chairman was accused of deceiving its
investors by inflating the company's net income by falsifying corporate records
over a period of years.' The Texas jury found Coopers liable for $4 million
19. Lochner, supra note 10; L.J. Patterson, Professional Liability Comments, President's
Prospectus, MICH. CPA, Winter 1993, at 3.
An Arizona Superior Court judge recently overturned the jury verdict in the Standard
Chartered case and ordered a new trial. Price Wins New Trial in Arizona Bank Case, supra note 11.
The trial was the longest civil trial in Arizona's history, lasting 11 '/ months. Judge John Sticht of
Maricopa County Superior Court later ordered a new trial because the jury may have been confused
about the methods of calculating damages on the claims in the suit. Sticht further stated that the
claims were "irreconcilably inconsistent." Brent Whiting, Record Verdict Voided: $338 Million
Award Against Auditor Lost, ARIZ. REPUBUC (Phoeniz, Ariz.), Dec. 17, 1992, at Al. Out of the
11-month-long trial, Price Waterhouse was only given 25 days to present its case. Accountant Hit
with Judgment of $338 Million; Litigation: An Arizona Jury Says a Price Waterhouse Audit Led to
a British Firm Making a Losing Investment in a Bank, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1992, at D1
[hereinafter Accountant Hit with Judgment of $338 Million].
20. Cf. Geoghan, supra note 5 (demonstrating the effect of punitive damages on out-of-court
settlements based on a 1987 study by the Institute of Civil Justice, which examined 24,000jury trials
in Cook County, Illinois, and found, in inflation-adjusted dollars, punitive damages jumped 1600%
from 1965 to 1984). For two excellent articles discussing Standard Chartered, which arrive at
opposite conclusions, see Leo R. Beus, Failed Audits Are No Basis for Protective Legislation, AcCr.
TODAY, Feb. 7, 1994, at 9, 10, 13; Paul F. Eckstein, Standard Chartered's Case is Based on
Distortion, Acr. TODAY, Feb. 7, 1994, at 9, 12, 13.
21. ANDERSEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 1-3; AUS Consultants, supra note 3, at 1. For a
discussion of the effects of punitive damages on out-of-court settlements, see Geoghan, supra note
5, at 46.
22. U.S. Nat'l Bank.v. Miniscribe Corp., No. 89-CV-1031-A (rex. Dist. Ct., Galveston Co.
1992); Geoghan, supra note 5, at 47.
23. Woolley & Schiller, supra note 3, at 32.
24. Geoghan, supra note 5, at 46. As proof of its fraudulent conduct, Miniscribe was found
to have shipped bricks, not disk drives, to its distributors and recorded the shipments as sales of disk
drives. Coopers Pays $95M More for Miniscribe, ACCT. TODAY, Nov. 9, 1992, at 63. A more
detailed article described Miniscribe's fraudulent actions to include renting a warehouse, boxing up
what appeared to be disk drives, and sending them to dealers with explicit instructions to send the
boxes, unopened, back to Miniscribe. Miniscribe would charge the boxes sent out as accounts
receivable, and then would mark them as inventory when they were returned unopened. These
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in compensatory damages and $200 million in punitive damages.' The
Miniscribe jury award was excessive in light of Miniscribe's chairman's
intentional and well-designed transactional trail of evidence supporting the
appearance of normal operations and activities.26
Lawsuits such as Miniscribe and Standard are being filed at an alarming
rate.27 In response to the increased number of suits being filed and the courts'
expansion of third-party liability in public accounting cases, CPAs are now
undertaking protective measures to mitigate their liability.3s Lawsuits are not
new to the accounting profession, and CPAs have traditionally taken internal
steps to attempt to reduce the possibility of liability while providing services."
CPAs routinely engage in two steps to mitigate their liability. In the first step,
CPAs require the creation of engagement letters, an employment contract
boxes were filled with bricks and not disk drives. Joseph D. Jamail, Keep the Case Rolling and
Jurors Will Follow, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1993, at S8.
25. Geoghan, supra note 5, at 47. A trial judge later set aside the Miniscribe verdict as
"contrary to the great weight of the evidence," and the case was settled out of court for about $40
million. Woolley & Schiller, supra note 3, at 32. A later published article indicated that Coopers
had agreed to pay an additional $95 million to the already paid $45 million to settle the Miniscribe
case. Other settlements related to the same case included Hambrecht & Quist, former investment
bankers, who paid $21.5 million to Miniscribe investors. Coopers was paid about $1 million for
the Miniscribe engagement. Coopers Pays $95M More for Miniscribe, supra note 24, at 1, 63. In
addition to the settlement in the Miniscribe action, the same defendants agreed to pay Miniscribe
investors an estimated $128 million in a Denver case. Many Big Verdicts Sealed Post-Trial to Avoid
Appeals, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 25, 1993, at S18.
26. Coopers Pays $95M More For Miniscribe, supra note 24; see infra notes 39-40 and
accompanying text. For another case demonstrating the problem, see the Phar-Mor case discussed
in Woolley & Schiller, supra note 3, at 32.
27. ANDERSEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 1-4; see supra notes 2, 6 and accompanying text. See,
e.g., Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992), Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ernst &
Whinney, 822 S.W.2d 592 (Tenn. 1991); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. First Republic Bank Corp.,
806 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Tex. 1992). For a general discussion on the vast number of public
accounting suits being filed, see Domenici, supra note 2.
28. For a discussion of CPA actions recently undertaken to mitigate liability, see infra notes
256-338 and accompanying text (relating to a lack of available insurance, increased service costs,
improved methods of screening clients, and declining to perform work for clients). Fifty-six percent
of accounting firms polled in a Wall Street Journal article indicated they were limiting the industries
that they would take as clients, and 79% of the firms polled were limiting services offered.
Domenici, supra note 2, at 3.
29. The CPA profession came to the United States from England and Scotland. For a thorough
historical discussion of the origin of CPAs, their functions, and introduction into America, see
CAUSEY, supra note 5, at 13-31. The first English case against an auditor was an 1887 case, Leeds
Estate, Building and Investment Co. v. Shepherd. CAUSEY, supra note 5, at 63. See also Dantzler
Lumber & Export Co. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 156 So. 116 (Fla. 1934); Maryland Casualty Co.
v. Cook, 35 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Mich. 1940); National Surety Corp. v. Lybrand, 256 App. Div.
226, 9 N.Y.S.2d 554 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939); Cereal Byproducts Co. v. Hall, 132 N.E.2d 27 (111.
1956).
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between the client and CPA.' In the second step, CPAs label their work
product as an opinion after completing an audit.3 CPAs label their audit work
product as an opinion because the term indicates the speculative nature of the
processes involved in reaching the opinion.
32
Courts in recent years have ignored the binding contractual nature of the
engagement letter, which is an employment contract, and have extended the
CPA's duty to outside third parties.33 In addition, the courts have tended to
ignore the speculative nature of opinion letters and have treated them as express
warranties of a company's financial position.' In other areas of tort and
contract law, employment contracts between two parties are legally recognized
as binding contracts formed between the party contracting for service and the
party providing the service. Why courts have chosen to treat an employment
contract formed between CPAs and their clients differently from employment
contracts formed between parties who are not CPAs is not apparent and must be
addressed to return uniformity to this area of law.35
An additional issue appearing in the more recent cases is the practice of
holding CPAs liable for failing to detect fraud and irregularities in a company's
records and financial statements. 36 Plaintiffs in a business failure action are
30. WIXoN Er AL., supra note 1, at 26-10 to -11; see also Maryland Casualty, 35 F. Supp. at
160.
31. WIXON Er AL., supra note 1, at 26-6 to -7.
32. WIXON ET AL., supra note 1, at 26-7. For a discussion on types of opinions, see infra part
III.C. and accompanying notes. "[Niumerous aspects of accounting are based upon opinions,
estimates, and judgments rather than objectively verifiable facts. After all, accounting is merely a
quantification of human activities, and human activities do not lend themselves to certainty in
measurement." Werner F. Ebke, In Search ofAlternatives: Comparative Reflections on Corporate
Governance and the Independent Auditor's Responsibilities, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 663, 683 (1984).
33. Rosenblum v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ernst &
Whinney, 822 S.W.2d 592 (Tenn. 1991); In re American Continental Corp., 794 F. Supp. 1424
(D.C. Ariz. 1992). See generally John Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of
Instrumental Ton Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1929, 1930 (1988).
34. Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Touche Ross & Co., 586 N.E.2d 600
(I11. App. Ct. 1991).,
35. See cases listed in the chart in infra note 174, parts 2 and 3. For a relevant discussion of
the courts' abandonment of the contract-law standard, see Thomas L. Gossman, The Fallacy of
Erpanding Accountants'Liability, 1988 COL. Bus. L. REv. 213, 215 n.11.
36. E.g., Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.
v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992); In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 802 F. Supp. 804
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1992).
"CPAs are rarely involved in causing a loss; rather, they are blamed for not discovering losses
caused by others." Patterson, supra note 19, at 4. See 1 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AU § 110.02 (1991) [hereinafter AICPA
STANDARDS], which states:
The financial statements are management's responsibility. The auditor's responsibility
is to express an opinion on the financial statements. Management is responsible for
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usually management, shareholders, investors, lending institutions, or govern-
adopting sound accounting policies and for establishing and maintaining an internal
control structure that will, among other things, record, process, summarize, and report
financial data that is consistent with management's assertions embodied in the financial
statements.
Id.
The terms concealment, forgery, and irregularities are defined as follows:
Concealment
7. Concealment is any attempt by the perpetrator of an irregularity to reduce the
likelihood of detection. Concealment usually involves manipulation of accounting
records or supporting documents to disguise the fact that the accounting records
are not in agreement with the underlying facts and circumstances. Concealment
can be skillful and elaborate or clumsy and limited. The auditor's ability to detect
a concealed irregularity depends on the skillfulness of the perpetrator, the
frequency and extent of manipulation, and the relative size of individual amounts
manipulated.
Forgery
8. Forgery may be used to create false signatures, other signs of authenticity, or
entire documents. . . . Also, unrecorded transactions are normally more difficult
to detect than concealment achieved by manipulation of recorded transactions.
However, the effect of concealment on the ability to detect an irregularity is
dependent on the particular circumstances. For example, an attempt to mislead
users of financial statements by recording large, fictitious revenue transactions late
in the period without supporting documentation would be more readily detected
than fictitious revenue transactions spread throughout the period, individually
immaterial in amount, and supported by legitimate-appearing invoices and
shipping documents. Moreover, both of these irregularities might be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to detect if collusion of customers is added to the
concealment scheme.
I AICPA STANDARDS, supra, at AU § 316.34 (1988).
.34 Appendix
Characteristics of Errors and Irregularities
1. Characteristics of error and irregularities that are relevant because of their
potential influence on the auditor's ability to detect such matters are materiality
of the effect on financial statements, level of management or employees involved,
extent and skillfulness of any concealment, relationship to established specific
control procedures, and the specific financial statements affected.
Level of Involvement
4. An irregularity may be caused by an employee or by management and, if by
management, by a relatively high or low level of management. The experience
of auditors indicates that the level of involvement often combines with other
characteristics in ways that have an influence on the auditor's ability to detect.
6. Material irregularities perpetrated by senior levels of management, including
an owner-manager of a small business, are infrequent, but when they do occur
they often engender widespread attention. These irregularities may not be
susceptible to prevention or detection by specific control procedures because
senior management is above the controls that deter employees or may override
these controls with relative ease . . ..
1 AICPA STANDARDS, supra, at AU § 316.34, Appendix (1988).
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mental agencies.37 CPAs are usually one of many named defendants, a group
which may also include the business owners or managers, attorneys, banks, and
financial advisors.' Courts are now recognizing the difficulty and uncertainty
in detecting a company's management's intentional actions of fraud and
concealment and have logically concluded that discovery may be beyond the
scope of the CPA's duty.39 However, some courts still impose liability on
public accounting firms, relying on the theory that the accountants should have
discovered these intentional acts of fraud and concealment. '
Public accounting firms do not seem to be asking for preferential treatment
by the courts and legislatures.4 On the contrary, public accounting firms
appear to be willing to pay for their percentage of fault.42 However, public
37. AUS Consultants, supra note 3, at i; Siliciano, supra note 33, at 1932; see generally R.
James Gormley, The Foreseen, The Foreseeable, and Beyond-Accountants'Liability to Nonclients,
14 SETON HALL L. REV. 528 (1984). "[T]he audit has since evolved to meet, in addition, the needs
of investors, lenders, suppliers, and the government." Id. at 553.
38. Gormley, supra note 37, at 553.
39. For example, in a recent case a Texas judge held a CPA firm not liable for failing to detect
intentional fraud committed by the company's president. Federal Deposit Ins., 967 F.2d at 166; see
also Bily, 834 P.2d at 745; In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 802 F. Supp. at 804. For a recent
securities fraud case where the court ruled in favor of the accounting firm, see Ligon v. Deloitte,
Haskins & Sells, 957 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1992). See generally Touche Ross v. Commercial Union
Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987).
40. See Rosenblum v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983); Congregation of the Passion, Holy
Cross Province v. Touche Ross & Co., 586 N.E.2d 600 (IIl. App. Ct. 1991); U.S. Nat'l Bank v.
Miniscribe, No. 89-CV-1031-A (Tex. Dist. Ct., Galveston Co. 1992). See also Mocatta Metals
Corp. v. Peat Marwick, Main & Co., No. M-1106, 1989 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4542 (April 4,
1989), in which the Supreme Court of New York held that Peat Marwick's failing to detect fraud
did not absolve it from its duty to detect that fraud. Mocatta Metals was a precious metals dealer.
Mocatta's credit manager, coin trader, and client committed fraud by setting up a scheme where the
credit manager allowed a client's receivable balance to increase from $2.3 million to $19 million
from 1982 to 1984. Id.
Although each of the three involved in the fraudulent scheme was sent to prison for their
actions, Peat Marwick, the auditor during that two year span of fraudulent activity, was sued. Peat
argued at trial that Mocatta committed inside fraud and knew of the activity. The court held that
negligent accountants are not free from liability because the client also conducted its business
negligently. The court stated that one of the purposes of an audit was to detect problems resulting
from a client's negligence. Client's Alleged Negligence Does Not Relieve Auditors' Responsibilities,
J. ACCT., Aug. 1991, at 25. See also supra note 5, describing the recent out-of-court settlements
by accounting firms regarding the savings and loan failures which were made after the accounting
firms were held liable. See In re American Continental Corp., 794 F. Supp. 1424 (D.C. Ariz.
1992). The accounting firms dropped out of In re American Continental Corp. and agreed to settle
out of court. Arthur Andersen & Co. agreed to pay $30 million; Arthur Young & Co., $64 million;
and Touche Ross & Co., $7.5 million. Tough Legal Battles Shaped Business World, NAT'L L.J.,
Dec. 28, 1992, at S7.
41. ANDERSEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 6.
42. Id. What CPAs object to most is paying damages in excess of their proportion of fault.
For a more thorough discussion, see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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accounting firms are asking for equitable legislation that, when applied by the
courts, will result in helping to ebb the tide of suits brought under the deep
pocket theory.43 Unfortunately, under the current system in most states and at
the federal level, joint and several liability forces a defendant-CPA firm to pay
a judgment award disproportionate to its fault."
This Note will discuss the current specialized problems facing public
accounting firms in litigation and examine the courts' current contradictory legal
43. ANDERSEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 7. The AICPA and over 300 organizations favor
securities litigation reform legislation. The legislation was introduced in the House by Congressman
W.J. (Billy) Tauzin and in the Senate by Senator Pete Domenici. The legislation is designed to
eliminate abusive, meritless litigation regarding securities fraud. Hearings on the legislation are
scheduled to be heard in 1993. Litigation Reform Bills Introduced; Drive for Passage Builds, J.
AccT., Nov. 1992, at 25-27. The legislation was introduced in Congress in August of 1992. Long-
Awaited Liability Reform Bill Introduced, supra note 4, at 3. See AICPA Testifies on Draft
Investment Advisors Bill, J. ACCT., Aug. 1992, at 17. For a general discussion of the proposed
legislation and an explanation of Illinois' legislation to limit legal liability suits against CPAs, see
Survey Shows Extent of Members' Concern Over Legal Liability, CPA LETTER, July-Aug. 1992, at
1. For a discussion on the proposed liability legislation, see Bills Fall Victim to Adjournment, J.
Accr., Dec. 1992, at 15.
Despite public accountants' enthusiasm in pushing proposed legislation through Congress,
Representative James P. Moran, a Democrat from Virginia, stated, "I don't think we're going to
get that legislation anytime soon." Moran further stated that the bill probably would not be
approved this year because "[m]any believe that accountants and lawyers contributed to or benefitted
from the improprieties of Keating and Milken." Sandy Hock, Liability Protection Measure Unlikely
to Pass U.S. House, ACCT. TODAY, June 7, 1993, at 2.
CPAs involved in auditing public companies can now help lobbying efforts in Washington by
joining the Coalition to Eliminate Abusive Securities Suits (CEASS). CEASS, with over 300
members, is asking for changes in securities laws which would implement proportional liability for
professionals. In addition, CEASS is asking that the proposal include a requirement that the loser
in the lawsuit pay the other side's legal fees if a baseless suit is filed. For more information on the
importance of CEASS's work, see Patterson, supra note 19, at 3, 4.
The Public Oversight Board (POB), a five-member board that oversees the SEC section of the
American Institute of CPAs division for CPA firms, is also supporting legislation which would make
auditors liable for "harm caused when they fail to meet their responsibilities, but not for 'the frauds,
the failures, the shortcomings of others.'" POB Annual Report Stresses Liability Crises, J. ACT.,
Feb. 1993, at 21. See id. for more information about the POB's suggested proposed structural and
legislative changes.
Despite the efforts of the various organizations and lobbying groups supporting limiting public
accountants' liability, at least one group of CPAs had decided to both aid and capitalize on the
problem. CPA Malpractice & Defense is a monthly publication written by CPAs reporting on issues
involving CPA litigation. The reporter is published in Los Angeles, California, and CPAs can
receive the publication with a trial six-month subscription or a year's subscription. CPA
MALPRACTICE & DEFENSE (Eldon F. Holl, CPA, ed., 1993).
For more information on how CPAs can aid their profession and get legislation passed at the
local, state, and federal levels, see Gary M. Bolinger et al., Legislating Liability Reform, J. AccT.,
July 1993, at 52-54, 56-57.
44. ANDERSEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 2, 6. For a discussion involving joint and several
liability and damages, see KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, at 345-55.
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liability theories in public accounting cases. A review of these theories will
show their past and present impact on the CPA profession and their potential
damaging effect on both the national and global economies.
Part II of this Note will describe the specific actions under which a CPA
may be sued.45 Part III of this Note will briefly explain the audit procedure
and its role in increasing CPA liability in public accounting cases. ' Part IV
will begin with a brief overview of the historical application of third-party
liability in public accounting cases and will offer case examples to demonstrate
the development of the current doctrines used in finding liability for negligence
in public accounting cases.47 Part V of this Note examines the legal and
economic effects of extending liability to accountants. 4  The courts' reactions
to the problems of expanding accountants' liability is detailed in Part VI.'
After an analysis of the pertinent cases and their effects, Part VI will also
separately discuss cases brought under the Securities and Exchange Act.
Separating the securities cases from the professional negligence and fraud cases
will facilitate a comprehension of the unique characteristics present in each type
of case and demonstrate the courts' different treatment of the cases based on
those characteristics. Finally, this Note will provide a proposed solution, a
model state statute, that will provide an equitable uniform standard of liability,
thus eliminating the problem of expanding third-party liability to accountants. 50
II. LEGAL LIABILrrY THEORIES
A. Racketeering Influenced Corruption Organization Act (RICO)
When a CPA is sued for alleged criminal acts, the suit is often brought
under the Racketeering Influenced Corruption Organization Act (RICO). 5' At
least one commentator, concerned about whether the use of RICO in public
accounting cases fits within the legitimate application of the Act's original
purpose, has widely criticized the Act. 52 RICO suits against public accountants
have also contributed to the overall problem of expansion of third-party liability
45. See infra notes 51-83 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 84-122 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 123-204 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 205-56 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 257-339 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 340-52 and accompanying text.
51. Racketeering Influenced Corruption Organization Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.S. § 1961 (1992);
e.g., In re American Continental Corp., 797 F. Supp. 1424 (D.C. Ariz. 1992). "RICO makes it
unlawful 'to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in [the] conduct of an enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity.'" Robert S. Peck & Charles F. Williams, RICO's Reach,
A.B.A. J., Oct. 1992, at 50 [hereinafter RICO's Reach].
52. Gossman, supra note 35, at 215 n.11.
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in public accounting cases.13 Under RICO, an accountant, if found liable, can
face treble damage awards.' The recovery of treble damages has spurred an
increased number of suits brought against public accountants under RICO.55
Accountants' fear of expanded liability, whether in a criminal or a civil case,
has caused the accountants to take self-protectionist measures that may ultimately
be detrimental to the suing plaintiff, the consumer, and the United States
economy. 
6
53. See In re American Continental Corp., 797 F. Supp. 1424 (D.C. Ariz. 1992). In Arthur
Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310 (filed June 27, 1992), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in granting Arthur Young summary judgment on the
alleged RICO violations portion of the case. Id. at 1324. The court recognized that Arthur Young's
involvement with the client "was limited to the audits, meetings with the Board of Directors to
explain the audits, and presentations at the annual meetings." Id. Although the court realized that
Arthur Young's involvement with its client caused it to commit "a number of reprehensible acts,"
the Eighth Circuit reasoned that "these acts in no way rise to the level of participation in the
management or operation" of the client's business. Id.
The recent United States Supreme Court's decision in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct.
1163 (1993), has the potential of limiting public accountants' liability under RICO. In a 7-2
decision, the Court held that "'to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs,' section 1962(c), one must participate in the operation or management of the
enterprise itself." Id. at 1173. The Court's holding resulted in affirming the lower courts' findings
that Arthur Young was entitled to summary judgment on the RICO claim, as Arthur Young's failure
to act was not sufficient for liability to attach under section 1962(c) of RICO. In arriving at its
decision, the Court looked at the legislative history of section 1962. Upon reviewing RICO's
"liberal construction" clause the court stated, "This clause obviously seeks to ensure that Congress'
intent is not frustrated by an overly narrow reading of the statute, but it is not an invitation to apply
RICO to new purposes that Congress never intended." Id. at 1172.
Although the Reves decision is a step in the right direction toward limiting the application of
RICO to public accountants, commentators are stressing that public accountants rely on the opinion
and its application cautiously. The two dissenting opinions in Reves acknowledged that a fine line
exists between auditing and management services, and as a result, many public accounting firms,
depending on the services that they provide to a client, may still be found liable for treble damages
under RICO. Quinton F. Seamons, Reves v. Ernst Ruling Shields Auditors From RICO Liability,
ACCT. TODAY, Aug. 23, 1993, at 10, 28-29. For another analysis on the Court's holding in Reves,
see Supreme Court Limits RICO, J. ACCT., May 1993, at 24. RICO reform efforts will continue
to be addressed by Congress. Bills Fall Victim to Adjournment, supra note 43; see Reves v. Ernst
& Young, 937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991). For more information on how RICO has contributed to
the increase in liability claims, see Professional Liability Insurance: Go Bare or Not?, J. ACCT.,
July 1991, at I11.
54. RICO's Reach, supra note 51, at 50. Along with the theories of negligence and fraud,
Price Waterhouse was sued by Standard Chartered under Arizona's state RICO statute. The jury
did not find Price had violated the Act. If the jury had found Price violated the Act, the damage
award of $338 million would have tripled to $1 billion. Accountant Hit with Judgment of $338
Million, supra note 19, at DI.
55. See supra notes 51, 53-54 and accompanying text.
56. ANDERSEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 3-5. For an economic analysis of the impact that
accountants' self-protectionist acts and scapegoat litigation may have on the United States, see AUS
Consultants, supra note 3. For an example of one self-protectionist measure that accountants are
taking and its potential impact on the suing plaintiff, see Bills Fall Victim to Adjournment, supra note
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B. Securities and Exchange Act
Aside from RICO, CPAs can also be sued under the Securities and
Exchange Act. 7 The Securities and Exchange Act is enforced by the Security
and Exchange Commission (SEC).' The SEC acts as a "watchdog" for
investors and shareholders. 9  In a securities violation suit, the SEC or
investors, either independently or in a class action, may bring suit against an
accounting firm.'
43, at 15. When auditors are held liable to third-parties or settle cases, auditors' insurance premiums
rise. As a result of the increased insurance rates, auditors raise their service costs to the client. The
client in turn charges higher rates for services and goods to compensate itself for paying higher costs
for accounting services. "The imposition upon auditors of liability to third parties for negligence
thus turns out to be no more than a global loss spreading technique, a vehicle for socializing
individual economic risks." Ebke, supra note 32, at 682. For a more detailed examination of the
economic effects of accountants' third-party liability crisis, see generally Ebke, supra note 32. See
infra part V.B. and accompanying notes.
57. Securities and Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. and Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq., cited in DAVID L. RATNER & THOMAS L. HAZEN,
SECURITIES REGULATION SELECTED STATUTES, RULES AND FoRMS (1991). A U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Florida recently upheld investors' rights to sue auditors for alleged
securities fraud and RICO violations regarding private and public security offerings. For a more
detailed case analysis, see Right to Bring Securities Fraud and RICO Action Against Auditors
Upheld, J. ACCT., June 1992, at 29. See, e.g., In re Sahlen & Assoc., Inc., Sec. Litig. 773 F.
Supp. 342 (S.D. Fla. 1992); In re Sioux Ltd., Sec. Exch. Comm'n Litig., 914 F.2d 61 (5th Cir.
1990); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. First Republic Bank Corp., 806 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Tex.
1992); Ligon v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 957 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1991). Aside from worrying
about being sued in a securities suit, auditors must also worry about the large companies "opinion
shopping." When a large company dislikes an auditor's opinion, many times the company will use
the threat of shopping for a new auditor to get the present auditor to acquiesce to the company's
demands. This pressure also may prevent the auditor from being independent. For a more complete
discussion of "opinion shopping" and the impact on accounting firms, see Daniel L. Goelzer, The
SEC and Opinion Shopping: A Case Study in the Changing Regulation of the Accounting Profession,
52 BROOK. L. REV. 1057 (1987).
58. HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL Er AL., SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 1 (1991-92).
59. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992) (using the term "watchdog"). The
1933 Act attempted to protect the investing public by requiring publicly held companies to file an
audited balance sheet and income statement prior to registering new stock issue. The 1934 Act
expanded on the 1933 Act's safeguards and required that audited financial statements be included
in annual reports when securities were to be listed on an exchange or in connection with a proxy
statement. Lorie Soares, The Big Eight, Management Consulting and Independence: Myth or
Reality?, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1511, 1512 (1988).
60. The Securities and Exchange Commission defines fraudulent financial reporting "as
intentional or reckless conduct, whether act or omission, that results in materially misleading
financial statements." Louis Braiotta, Jr., Preventing Fraudulent Reporting: Auditing for Honesty,
A.B.A. J., May 1, 1992, at 76. CPAs are usually implicated in fraudulent financial reporting under
the theories of questionably applied GAAP and deliberate financial record distortions. Plaintiffs
usually bring suit under Rule l0b and Rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Securities Act and under the common
law, alleging fraud, deceit, and negligence. CPAs are typically only one of many named defendants
in SEC suits. Id. See cases listed in supra note 57; see also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 414 U.S.
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The anti-fraud provisions are the most common sections of the Securities
Act used to bring suits against public accountants. 6 The frequency of public
56 (1990).
61. Under § 12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, liability attaches for the sale of unregistered
nonexempt securities. Accountants can predict with relative ease whether or not they may be liable
because liability requires a transfer of securities. However, a real problem exists involving Rule
lob-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Rule lOb-5 forbids a false statement of material fact or omission of a necessary fact regarding
the purchase or sale of any security. Any misstatement, whether intentional, reckless, or without
knowledge of its veracity, can incur liability, even if a CPA did not make any omission of fact or
misstatements. The generally accepted test for determining aiding and abetting is: (1) a securities
law violation by someone who is otherwise liable, (2) knowledge of the violation, and (3) substantial
assistance in the violation.
Aside from possible liability being attached under § 12(1) of the 1933 Act and Rule 10b-5 of
the 1934 Act, a CPA may be liable under § 12(2) of the 1933 Act. Section 12(2) is similar to Rule
lOb-5. Stephen M. Quinlivan, What Every Accountant Should Know About Securities Law, J.
ACCT., July 1992, at 109.
The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1993), provides:
§ 12 Any person who-
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 5, or
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of section 3,
other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) thereof), by the use of any means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails,
by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement
of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not
sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person
purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court
of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security with
interest thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns
the security.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1934), provides:
§ 10 It shall be unlawful for any person, directly, indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(a) To effect a short sale, or to use or employ any stop-loss order in
connection with the purchase or sale, of any security registered on a
national securities exchange, in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulation as the Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
The Rules and Regulations Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1934),
provides:
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accounting suits brought under the anti-fraud provisions is rising because the
provisions apply even if the transaction is exempt; thus, it is now easier to bring
suit under the Securities Act.62 One additional benefit to plaintiffs in an SEC
suit is that the CPA has the burden of disproving the plaintiff's allegations.63
If a CPA is found liable in an SEC suit, the Act states that the potential for
liability may be the full cost of the business failure.'
C. Common Law Torts
Negligence and fraud are two common law forms of action that may be
brought against a CPA. 5  Fraud is an intentional act to deceive another.'
Rule lOb-5 Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
See also RATNER & HAZEN, supra note 57.
62. Securities are required to be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission prior
to their offering for sale, excluding any applicable exemption. It is this exemption, such as a sale
of a security without a public offering, that is required before an action under certain sections of the
1933 and 1934 Acts may be brought. Quinlivan, supra note 61, at 109.
The antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, primarily Rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act and
§ 12(2) of the 1933 Act, do not require the exemption, thus facilitating SEC suits. Liability can
attach under Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Act of 1934 if a misstatement of a material fact or an
omission of a necessary fact in connection with the purchase of a sale or security is intentional or
reckless. Additionally, a CPA may never have made a misstatement to be liable under Rule lOb-5.
Id. at 111-12. The case of Ligon stated when a primary violation occurs under § lOb and Rule lOb-
5 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act. According to the Ligon court, a violation occurs when:
1) the primary violator acted in a manner prohibited by rule in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities; 2) the primary violator acted with scienter; 3) the
wrongful act or omission was material and plaintiffs relied on the act or omission; and
4) the plaintiffs were damaged by their reliance.
Ligon v. Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 957 F.2d 546, 547 (8th Cir. 1992); see also Harris v. Union
Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1986). To see the court's strict compliance requirements for
properly and fully pleading an alleged violation of § l0b of the Securities and Exchange Act and
RICO violations, see Farlow v. Peat Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1992).
63. CAUSEY, supra note 5, at 51-54.
64. Pickering, supra note 2, at 2.
65. For cases demonstrating both common law actions of fraud and negligence, see Rosenblum
v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983) and Mocatta Metals Corp. v. Peat Marwick, Main& Co., No.
23965/88 (N.Y. Cty. Sup. Ct., Apr. 8, 1991).
A recent New York federal district court ruling has the potential of greatly reducing the
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Negligence is a person's departure from a reasonable person's standard of
conduct.67 A unique legal problem exists when a plaintiff brings a cause of
action under the theory of accountant negligence,6 as opposed to fraud. This
problem is created when the courts apply one of three liability theories to prove
negligence in public accounting cases: strict privity, section 552 of the
Restatement Second of Torts (the Restatement standard), or the foreseeability
standard.' To find liability under strict privity, a legal contractual relationship
must exist.' The strict privity rule is easy for courts and juries to apply
because the rule requires the existence of a contract; thus, the factfinder need
not interpret or predict subjective intent. 71
number of successful third-party suits brought against public accountants. In re Crazy Eddie Sec.
Litig., 802 F. Supp. 804 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), was a case where internal management and employees
committed fraud in order to benefit their company. Id. Attempting to entice investors by enhancing
its stock value, Crazy Eddie's controller inflated net income, inventory, and the company's sales
figures over a two-year period. A physical inventory later revealed that the inventory was overstated
by $65 million and the company's net worth was overstated by $86 million. After Crazy Eddie went
bankrupt, the company's liquidator filed suit against KPMG Peat Marwick, the company's auditors,
claiming negligence and breach of contract for failing to discover fraud in the company's financial
statements. The court held that if officers of a corporation commit fraud to benefit the company,
or themselves and the company, then fraud can be imputed to the corporation, thus barring claims
against the auditors. Officers' Fraud on Corporation's Behalf Bars Recovery Against Auditors, J.
ACCT., May 1993, at 24.
66. Black's Law Dictionary defines fraud as:
An intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another in reliance upon
it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or to surrender a legal right. A
false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or
misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed,
which deceives and is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal
injury.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 660 (6th ed. 1990).
67. Black's Law Dictionary defines negligence as: "The omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those ordinary considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs,
would do, or the doing of something which a reasonable and prudent man would not do." BLACK's
LAW DICTIONARY 1032 (6th ed. 1990).
68. Usually when a plaintiff sues an accountant under the theory of negligence, the theory is
defined as either professional negligence or negligent misrepresentation. For a case that
distinguishes between the two forms of negligence theory, see Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834
P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992). For more information on accountants' liability for malpractice, see Willis
W. Hagen II, Certified Public Accountants' Liability for Malpractice: Effect of Compliance with
GAAP and GAAS, 13 J. CONTEMP. L. 65 (1987). For more information on CPAs' liability for
negligent misrepresentation, see Howard B. Wiener, Common Law Liability of the Certified Public
Accountant for Negligent Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 233 (1983).
69. Gormley, supra note 37, at 551. For an explanation of privity, see infra notes 137-62 and
accompanyingtext. For an explanation of Restatement Second of Torts § 552, see infra notes 163-81
and accompanying text. For an explanation of foreseeability, see infra notes 182-204 and
accompanying text.
70. 4 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 778 (1951)
71. Id.
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Confusion in rule application exists between the Restatement standard and
the foreseeability standard.' The uncertainty in application exists because of
the relative closeness in the terminology used in both the Restatement standard
and the foreseeability standard.' The ambiguous terms, "foreseen" and
"foreseeable," are used in both of the standards.74 However, the unclear and
undefinable meanings of both terms have caused courts to misapply or mis-
interpret the terms.75 The courts' inability to correctly apply their proper
jurisdictional test only adds to jury confusion, which ultimately results in
judgment awards disproportionate to fault.7' This confusion regarding the
meaning and use of the terms in rule application also affects the defendants'
ability to properly defend themselves in a court of law.
D. Legal Liability of Public Accounting Firms
Predictability and fairness, the fundamental objectives of our adversarial
system, have become non-existent in deciding public accounting cases. 77 For
72. Gormley, supra note 37, at 540-52.
73. Id.
74. Section 552 states:
§ 552 Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss
caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise
reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited to
loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient
intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information
to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially
similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information extends to
loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty is created, in any
of the transactions in which it is intended to protect them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977); see also id. § 552, cmt. g, h (delineating the
scope of parties that the public accountant may reasonably foresee using the information). For a
discussion on the foresecability doctrine, see KEErON ET AL., supra note 9, at 169-73. For an
application of § 552(h), see Citizens State Bank v. Timm, 335 N.W.2d 361, 365-66 (Wis. 1983).
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). See Gormley, supra note 37, at 530-31
for a more complete discussicn of the courts' confusion between the terms foreseen, foreseeable, and
reasonably foreseeable.
76. U.S. Nat'l Bank v. Miniscribe Corp., No. 89-CV-1031-A (Tex. Dist. Ct., Galveston Co.
1992); Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse, No. 88-34414 (Ariz. Super. Ct., Maricopa
Co. 1992).
77. For a more detailed explanation of the adversarial system, see generally JOHN COUND ET
AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 1989).
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example, many accounting firms perform audits for large national and
international lending institutions and companies.' An accounting firm may be
sued in numerous states for negligence regarding the same audit report or
financial statements." The auditor's liability for the same audit rests on each
state's rule for determining liability in a public accounting suit.' Thus,
lawsuits brought in different states may yield different results depending on the
theory of.liability applied to find negligence."'
Additionally, different states may impose various damage awards upon
finding negligence, depending on that state's damage award provisions.8 2
78. See ANDERSEN El" AL., supra note 1, at 4; see also infra text accompanying note 226. The
Big Six audit 90% (4748 of 5266) of U.S. publicly traded companies with annual sales over $1
million. ANDERSEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 4.
79. E.g., U.S. Nat'l Bank v. Miniscribe Corp., No. 89-CV-1031-A(Tex. Dist. Ct., Galveston
Co. 1992). Although Coopers and Lybrand has recently settled the Miniscribe case, investors sued
Coopers in both Colorado and Texas regarding the same audit performed for Miniscribe. For
settlement details regarding Miniscribe, see supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
80. An auditor may or may not be liable in a negligence suit. The auditor's liability rests upon
the courts' and jurisdictions' application of either the Restatement Second § 552 standard, the privity
rule, or the foreseeability standard. In a state applying the privity requirement, an auditor will not
be found liable unless that auditor had a contractual relationship with the party bringing suit. Hagen,
supra note 68, at 183, 184; see also id., at 192-93 (discussing a court's recent holding of liability
in a relationship that was so close as to approach the privity requirement).
If a state applied the Restatement standard, an accountant would be liable if the party bringing
suit was within a class of persons whose reliance on the negligent misrepresentation was or should
have been foreseen by the accountant. Under the Restatement standard, liability does not extend to
parties whose reliance was foreseeable or reasonably foreseeable to the accountant. Gormley, supra
note 37, at 529-30.
The foreseeability standard is, out of the three rules, the broadest for finding liability. An
auditor is liable under the foreseeability standard if the party bringing suit was a foreseeable user
of the auditor's work. Although the foreseeability courts tend to only find non-liability where strong
public policy requires it, these courts usually review certain considerations before holding an
accountant liable. The courts' considerations include:
(1) The injury is too remote from the negligence; or (2) the injury is too wholly out of
proportion to the culpability of the negligent tortfeasor; or (3) in retrospect it appears
too highly extraordinary that the negligence would have brought about the harm; or (4)
because allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable a burden on the negligent
tort-feasor; or (5) because allowance of recovery would be to likely to open the way for
fraudulent claims, or (6) allowance of recovery would enter a field that has not sensible
or just stopping point.
Gossman, supra note 35, at 224-25 n.60.
81. For examples of case decisions and how they can differ depending on the various applicable
state law, see infra part IV.A-C. Theoretically, because the applicable state's theory will dictate
whether a public accountant is liable for negligence, a public accountant may be found liable in one
state and not in another, yet the lawsuits may be based on the same audit report.
82. Many states adhere to joint and several liability. For example, in a state that applies joint
and several liability, a guilty defendant would be liable for the entire judgment if no other solvent
defendant existed. However, other states apply the doctrine of comparative negligence, and in the
same scenario would only hold the guilty defendant liable for its percentage of fault. Because
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Accounting firms, like any other tort defendants, should be afforded some
predictability in the applicable legal rule in order to have an opportunity to
defend themselves to the best of their abilities. Public accounting firms should
be subject to one clear standard for liability so that they know how to conform
their conduct and avoid liability, rather than being subject to a different standard
in each state where the firm does business. 3
III. THE AccouNTANT's PRIMARY FUNCTION-THE AUDIT
The audit's importance in the financial and business world has caused this
service to be one of the most highly litigated issues in public accounting
cases.' In addition, audits represent the majority of work performed by
CPAs.u Lawsuits may be brought against the public accounting firm for both
technical preparation and interpretation of the audit. Though historically audits
have always been used by and performed for clients, the increased use of audits
in other areas of business and by outside third parties has contributed to the high
visibility of auditing services.8 6 The historical importance of the audit, and its
different states apply different remedy theories, one defendant, concerning the same action, may be
liable for the full amount of the judgment award in one state and only the percentage equal to its
fault in another state. For a more detailed discussion of the impact of joint and several liability on
the accounting profession, see The Liability Crisis in the United States: Impact on the Accounting
Profession, 1. ACCr., Nov. 1992, at 19.
Tennessee adheres to the doctrine of comparative negligence. McIntyre v. Balentine and East-
West Motor Freight, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992). Proportionate liability is being sought in
the new federal securities bill. Proportionate liability, unlike joint and several liability, allows the
guilty defendants to only pay a damage amount according to their proportion of assessed fault.
Litigation Refomi Bills Introduced; Drive for Passage Builds, J. Accr., Nov. 1992, at 25.
83. To see how the courts' application of three different standards falls among the states, see
infra note 174 (chart).
84. Clients request audits because third parties, in particular, the SEC and lending institutions,
require an independent opinion be issued regarding a client's financial statements. Access to
relevant financial information about a company is essential to a company's business planning, to
those in the private sector, including shareholders and institutional lenders, and to those in the public
sector, including the Internal Revenue Service. Although the company prepares its own financial
statements, the job of the auditor is to evaluate the statements and render an opinion on them. The
audit, therefore, is a very important accounting service to the business and financial world.
Gossman, supra note 35, at 213, 237.
For an excellent, brief commentary outlining auditor's responsibilities and potential liability
under Statements on Auditing Standards (SAS) number 54, see Donald L. Neebes et al., Auditing:
Illegal Acts: What Are the Auditor's Responsibilities?, J. ACCT., Jan. 1991, at 82.
85. WIXON ET AL., supra note 1, at 26-2.
86. See Gossman, supra note 35, at 213-14. Many companies wishing to merge with another
company or buy out a competitor use the potential acquisition's audit to determine if that company
is a good risk or investment. Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse, No. 88-34414 (Ariz.
Super. Ct., Maricopa Co. 1992). Potential private shareholders or investors may also use the audit
to determine if a company is a good investment. U.S. Nat'l Bank v. Miniscribe, No. 89-CV-103 1-A
(Tex. Dist. Ct., Galveston Co. 1992).
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modem use, must be explained briefly before this Note can address the impact
of the expansion of third-party liability in public accounting cases.
A. Audit Reports
CPAs perform audits for a variety of reasons. The SEC requires that
publicly held corporations have independent audits performed to protect
investors and shareholders.8 7 Smaller businesses and non-publicly held
corporations have audits performed as a means of ensuring that their financial
condition is solvent.88 As a security measure, lending institutions and bonding
companies also require that audits be performed prior to the lending of funds or
to insure performance.8
9
Auditors are usually CPAs and must be totally independent.' This
independence is required to assure that the CPA does not have any conflicts of
interest with the client, thus providing an assurance that the audit will be
performed objectively and will be beyond reproach. 9 Audits are examinations
that lead to the formation of opinions regarding clients' financial statements. 92
These opinions are not about the accuracy of the value of a corporation or
whether the corporation is a good investment, but only to opine on the fairness
with which the statements present, in all material respects, "financial position,
results of operation, and changes in financial position in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles." 93  CPAs perform audits by
examining and reviewing a company's internal accounting system, financial
87. Gossman, supra note 35, at 213; see WIXON Er AL., supra note 1, at 2-9 to -15, 26-7
(containing a more in-depth discussion of SEC regulations and requirements of auditors). See
generally CAUSEY, supra note 5, at 15-18 (containing a historical discussion of the SEC and its
impact on public accountants).
88. Wiener, supra note 68, at 240.
89. Gossman, supra note 35, at 213; Wiener, supra note 68, at 237.
90. CAUSEY, supra note 5, at 27. To maintain an independent stature when performing
professional services, the CPA must act with integrity and objectivity. A CPA must be independent
in fact and appearance. When CPAs perform tax practice and management advisory services, only
independence in fact (an unbiased state of mind) is required, and when CPAs perform audit services
both independence in fact and appearance ("absence of affiliations or influencing factors that might
lead to actual or presumptive conflicts of interest") are required. Id. See also 1 AICPA
STANDARDS, supra note 36, ET § 101.02, § 55 (1992); Gossman, supra note 35, at 213; WIXON
ET AL., supra note 1, at 26-6; see generally 1 AICPA STANDARDS, supra note 36, AU § 110
(1991).
91. See CAUSEY, supra note 5, at 27-30; see generally WIXON Er AL., supra note 1, at 26-10.
92. WIXON ET AL., supra note 1, at 26-6; Gossman, supra note 35, at 213; "The report by the
auditor is the way 'he expresses his opinion or, if circumstances require, disclaims an opinion.'"
Wiener, supra note 68, at 237.
93. 1 AICPA STANDARDS, supra note 36, AU § 110 (1991). See Gossman, supra note 35, at
233. "An audit report is not designed to guarantee the accuracy of the financial statements prepared
by management, but only to attest to the fairness of management's presentation." Id.
Faussié: Limiting Liability in Public Accounting Suits: A Desparate Appeal
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1994
1062 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28
statements, and accounting records." At the conclusion of this examination,
the CPA renders an opinion. 95
B. Parties To An Audit
The auditing process begins when an auditor and client enter into a
contractual relationship by signing an engagement letter. 96 An engagement
letter limits the type of services that the auditor will perform, describes the
accounting standards and substantive tests' the auditor will use, and defines
94. When an auditor performs a financial examination, audit work is accomplished:
1. By a general review of the accounts and records and comparison of the figures shown
on the statements with the sources from which they are drawn
2. By a study of the accounting procedures regularly followed by the company and
consideration of any departures from those practices
3. By independent sampling tests (through inspection, correspondence, or other means)
of the existence of assets
4. By the application of various audit tests to determine, so far as reasonably possible,
that all liabilities are reflected in the balance sheet in actual or approximate amounts
5. By actual analyses, tests, and over-all review of the income and expense accounts
6. By test procedures designed to determine the authenticity and general correctness of
the accounts on which the statements are based.
WIXON Er AL., supra note 1, at 26-12. See 1 AICPA STANDARDS, supra note 36, AU § 110
(1991). "The ultimate objective of an audit is to express an opinion on the fairness with which the
financial statements 'present financial position, results of operations, and changes in financial
position in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.'" Wiener, supra note 68, at
237. Thomas Bilek, Accountants' Liability to the Third Parry and Public Policy: A Calabresi
Approach, 39 Sw. L.J. 689, 691 (1985); Hagen, supra note 68, at 66.
95. Hagen, supra note 68, at 69; 1 AICPA STANDARDS, supra note 36, AU § 110 (1991); see
also WIXON ET AL., supra note 1, at 26-6.
96. A written contract should be signed by the client and auditor that states the nature, scope,
and limitations of the auditor's responsibilities and the limits of the audit. "Every audit engagement
is a contract, expressed or implied, in which the auditor agrees to make an audit ... " WIXON ET
AL., supra note 1, at 26-10.
97. Substantive tests are performed during field work. The third Standard of Field Work states
how the tests are to be performed. The third standard reads, "Sufficient competent evidential matter
is to be obtained through inspection, observation, inquiries and confirmations to afford a reasonable
basis for an opinion regarding the financial statements under examination." WIXON ET AL., supra
note 1, at 26-14. The evidence gathered in substantive tests includes:
1. Physical examination by the auditor of the thing represented in the accounts




a. Prepared outside the enterprise under examination
b. Prepared inside the enterprise under examination
4. Statements by officers and employees of the company under examination
a. Formal
b. Informal
5. Calculations performed by the auditor
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the type of opinion expected to be rendered along with any qualifications or
limitations that may result." This employment contract between the auditor
6. Satisfactory internal control procedures
7. Subsequent actions by the company under examination and by others
8. Subsidiary or detail records with no significant indications of irregularity
9. Interrelationships within the data examined
Id. at 26-15.
Audit techniques are methods the auditor uses to collect the evidence. The basic techniques include:
1. Physical examination and count
2. Confirmation
3. Examination of authoritative documents and comparison with the record
4. Recomputation
5. Retracing bookkeeping procedures
6. Scanning
7. Inquiry
8. Examination of subsidiary records
9. Correlation with related information
10. Observation of pertinent activities and conditions
Id. at 26-15 to -16. For a more detailed analysis of the above techniques, see id., at 26-16 to -17.
98. Id. An example of a small firm's sample engagement letter reads as follows:
Dear _ ,
We are pleased to confirm our understanding of the services we are to provide for
__ for the year ended . We will audit the combined balance sheet of
as of __ and the related combined statements of support, revenue,
and expenses, and changes in fund balances and cash flows for the year then ended. Also, the
document we submit to you will include the following additional information that will be
subjected to the auditing procedures applied in our audit of the combined financial statements:
1. Combining balance sheet
2. Schedule of expenses: support services and general and administrative
3. Schedule to reconcile financial statement basis support and revenue to amounts
reported for cost reimbursement
Our audit will be made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards
and will include tests of the accounting records of _ and affiliates and other
procedures we consider necessary to enable us to express an unqualified opinion that the
combined financial statements are fairly presented, in all material respects, in conformity
with generally accepted accounting principles. If our opinion is other than unqualified,
we will fully discuss the reasons with you in advance.
Our procedures will include tests of documentary evidence supporting the
transactions recorded in the accounts and direct confirmation of receivables and certain
other assets and liabilities by correspondence with selected funding sources, creditors,
and financial institutions. We will request written representations from your attorneys
as part of the engagement, and they may bill you for responding to this inquiry. At the
conclusion of our audit, we will also request certain written representations from you
about the combined financial statements and related matters.
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An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and
disclosures in the combined financial statements; therefore, our audit will involve
judgment about the number of transactions to be examined and the areas to be tested.
Also, we will plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether
the combined financial statements are free of material misstatement. However, because
of the concept of reasonable assurance and because we will not perform a detailed
examination of all transactions, there is a risk that material errors, irregularities, or
illegal acts, including fraud or defalcations, may exist and not be detected by us. We
will advise you, however, of any matters of that nature that come to our attention and
will include such matters in the reports required by the service contracts. Our
responsibility as auditors is limited to the period covered by our audit and does not
extend to matters that might arise during any later periods for which we are not engaged
as auditors.
We understand that you will provide us with the basic information required for
our audit and that you are responsible for the accuracy and completeness of that
information. We will advise you about appropriate accounting principles and their
application and will assist in the preparation of your financial statements, but the
responsibility for the financial statements remains with you. This responsibility includes
the maintenance of adequate records and related internal control structure policies and
procedures, the selection and application of accounting principles, and the safeguarding
of assets.
We understand that your employees will prepare certain account analyses and
schedules and will locate any source documents selected by us for testing.
Our audit is not specifically designed and cannot be relied on to disclose
reportable conditions, that is, significant deficiencies in the design or operation of the
internal control structure. However, during the audit, if we become aware of such
reportable conditions or ways that we believe management practices can be improved,
we will communicate them to you in a separate letter.
As part of our engagement we will prepare the following federal information
returns for the year ended
Separate return for , Inc.
Group (combined) return for and
We expect to begin our audit on approximately __ and to complete your
information returns and issue our report no later than _
Our fees for these services will be based on the actual time spent at our standard
hourly rates. Our standard hourly rates vary according to the degree of responsibility
involved and the experience level of the personnel assigned to your audit. Our invoices
for these fees will be rendered each month as work progresses and are payable on
presentation. Based on our preliminary estimates, the fee should approximate $
for the audit and $ for the information returns. These estimates are based on
anticipated cooperation from your personnel and the assumption that unexpected
circumstances will not be encountered during the audit. If significant additional time
is necessary, we will discuss it with you and arrive at a new estimate before we incur
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and client states the specific services the CPA will perform and the sum of
money the client will pay in accordance with the terms of the letter. Both the
client and the auditor recognize that the terms of the letter are legally
enforceable upon either party. 99
The courts' expansion of third-party liability indicates that the legally
binding contractual relationship that the engagement letter creates between the
auditor and client is of de minimis importance."se Instead of treating the
engagement letter as an enforceable contract between the auditor and the client,
courts have expanded the contract to bind the auditor not only to the client, but
to any other foreseeable party who would rely on the audit.0 1
Audits are currently the source of dispute in public accounting cases
because clients are not the only users of the auditors' opinions."°2 Third
parties such as lenders, financial institutions, shareholders, and investors may
the additional costs.
We appreciate the opportunity to be of service to _ , Inc. and believe this
letter accurately summarizes the significant terms of our engagement. If you have any
questions, please let us know. If you agree with the terms of our engagement as
described in this letter, please sign the enclosed copy and return it to us, and this letter
will continue in effect until canceled by either party.
Very truly yours,
RESPONSE




Siegfried, Crandall, Vos & Lewis, P.C., Kalamazoo, Michigan, CPA firm.
99. WIXON Er AL., supra note 1, at 26-10 to -11.
100. U.S. Nat'l Bank v. Miniscribe, No. 89-CV-1031-A(Tex. Dist. Ct., Galveston Co. 1992);
Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse, No. 88-34414 (Ariz. Super. Ct., Maricopa Co.
1992).
101. Miniscribe, No. 89-CV-1031-A; Standard Chartered PLC, No. 88-34414; see infra note
174 (chart).
102. See Gormley, supra note 37, at 533; see also supra text accompanying note 88.
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all refer to an auditor's opinion."3 A major difference exists, however,
between the auditor's relationship with the client and with a third party who uses
the auditor's opinion. Unlike the client and the auditor, who have a legally
binding contractual relationship that was created by the engagement letter, third
parties who refer to the auditor's opinion have not entered into a contract that
creates a legally binding relationship between them and the auditor. "°
Engagement letters define the terms of the employment contract between the
auditor and the client, and unless expressly stated, should bind only those
signing the contract. 05
C. Opinions Rendered
Auditors issue one of four types of opinions after they have completed the
five stage process for the audit." The four types of opinions that a CPA may
103. Siliciano, supra note 33, at 1932; For an analysis of cases and how the courts have
expanded third-party liability, thus permitting third parties to rely on an auditor's opinion, see
Gormley, supra note 37. For examples of the differences in courts' expansion of third-party
liability, see infra note 174 (chart).
104. See Siliciano, supra note 33, at 1933. The "employment contract" is usually entered into
exclusively by the auditor and the client. However, third parties may be added to the engagement
letter either by their own request or the client's request. When the third party is added to the
engagement letter, that third party is in privity with the auditor. Id. at 1956-65. For an example
of how third parties may be added to an engagement letter, see supra note 98.
105. WIXON Elr AL., supra note 1, at 26-10 to -11; see supra note 98 (engagement letter).
106. Hagen, supra note 68, at 69. "It must be emphasized that the word 'opinion' has been
selected by independent accountants with considerable care as the best term to describe the
conclusions reached through performance of an audit. It is an opinion and nothing more." WIXON
ET AL., supra note 1, at 26-7. "The auditor does not and cannot give guaranties or assurances that
financial statement are accurate or reliable. At best he can describe his examination and express the
opinions he has formed through performance of that examination." Id.
Usually, opinion letters contain two main paragraphs, the scope and opinion paragraphs.
However, depending on the type of opinion issued, other explanation paragraphs detailing the
auditor's reasoning will also be included. The CPA's opinion, which is rendered after the audit,
generally asserts that the client's financial statements, including the balance sheet, income statement,
statement of retained earnings, statement of changes in financial position, and additional notes, taken
as a whole, fairly present the client's financial position and operations for the period stated. Hagen,
supra note 68, at 69-70, 72-76.
After an engagement letter is signed, an auditor implements a five-stage process in performing
the audit. Gossman, supra note 35, at 213. The first stage is the planning stage. 1 AICPA
STANDARDS, supra note 36, AU §§ 324.07, 324.10 (1992). In this stage, the auditor must gather
information concerning the client's internal accounting system and controls, and the client's basic
business operations. The auditor uses this information to determine how to schedule and coordinate
the auditing team's efforts in order to maximize cost efficiency and work within the established
accounting and reporting system. Gossman, supra note 35, at 214. See also 1 AICPA STANDARDS,
supra note 36, AU §§ 319, 322, 325 (1992) (relating to overall impact of control structure from the
planning stage to the reporting stage). The audit planning stage is initially performed prior to field
work, and it continues throughout the audit. The term "field work" refers to the physical and
quantitative auditing procedures performed (normally) at the client's physical site in the "field."
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Hence, the term field work. Field work is completed as of and prior to the date of the opinion
letter. Crandall Interview, supra note 7. The standards for field work are set forth in the Generally
Accepted Auditing Standards. For a list of the substantive tests used in field work, see supra note
97. For a more complete discussion of the first standard of field work, see 1 AICPA STANDARDS,
supra note 36, AU § 311 (1989). Auditors must be allowed to remain flexible to alter or change
direction in the auditing process. New discoveries of relevant information that may materially affect
the company's financial position may not be found until the later stages of the audit. Crandall
Interview, supra note 7; 1 AICPA STANDARDS, supra note 36, AU § 435.06 (1992).
In the second stage, the auditor evaluates the client's internal control system. Sections 319
and 322 of the AICPA Professional Standards set forth the information regarding internal control
structures. 1 AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, supra note 36, §§ 319, 322 (1992). Section 319
states:
A U § 319 Consideration of the Internal Control Structure in a Financial Statement Audit
.02 An entity's internal control structure, for purposes of this section,
consists of three elements: the control environment, the accounting system,
and control procedures.
Id. at § 319.
1 AICPA STANDARDS, supra note 36, Appendix B, AU § 319.67 (1993), defines the control
environment as:
[Tihe collective effect of various factors on establishing, enhancing, or mitigating the
effectiveness of specific policies and prucedures. Such factors include (1) management
philosophy and operating style, (2) organizational structure, (3) the function of the board
of directors and its committees, (4) methods of assigning authority and responsibility,
(5) management control methods, (6) the internal audit function, (7) personnel policies
and practices, and (8) external influences concerning the entity.
Id. Appendix B further defines an accounting system as: "the methods and records established to
identify, assemble, analyze, classify, record, and report an entity's transactions and to maintain
accountability for the related assets and liabilities." Id.
Control procedures are defined as "the policies and procedures in addition to the control
environment and accounting system that management has established to provide reasonable assurance
that specific entity objectives will be achieved." Id. This evaluation during the second stage helps
the auditor to form a procedural checklist and to effectively gather information that will dictate the
type and extent of auditing procedures to be implemented. Hagen, supra note 68, at 68.
The auditor performs compliance tests in the third stage. The compliance tests are designed
to indicate if the client's internal control system is functioning properly. The first three stages will
help the auditor to determine if the initially proposed audit program can be implemented without
modification. The extent of the substantive tests is determined from the compliance tests' results.
Id. Substantive tests are defined as: "Tests of details and analytical procedures performed to detect
material misstatements in the account balance, transaction class, and disclosure components of
financial statements." 1 AICPA STANDARDS, supra note 36, Appendix B, AU § 319.67 (1993); see
also AU § 326.09-.13 (1992). Examples of substantive tests include random confirmation of
accounts receivable, observing physical inventory, estimation of liabilities, and examination of
management's accounting principles. Hagen, supra note 68, at 68.
The fourth stage requires the auditor to evaluate the audit program and based on that
evaluation, to modify the audit to conform to the compliance test results. The fifth and final stage
requires the auditor to evaluate the information obtained to determine if the client's financial
statements accurately reflect the company's economic condition. The auditor issues an opinion after
the audit is completed. Hagen, supra note 68, at 68. A sample Independent Auditor's Report reads
as follows:
We have audited the accompanying balance sheet of as of __ __,and
the related statements of revenue and expenses, association equity and cash flows for the
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render are an unqualified, qualified, adverse, or disclaimed opinion on the
company's financial position." 7 An unqualified opinion is the most frequently
issued opinion." s CPAs issue this opinion if they do not have any exceptions,
reservations, or qualifications that the financial statements present fairly the
client's financial position, results of operations, and changes in financial
position." 9 Notably, an unqualified opinion does not ensure the non-existence
of fraud or that the numbers in the financial statement are accurate, nor is that
its purpose. "0
A CPA must issue a qualified opinion or an adverse opinion when an
improper accounting treatment that is not in compliance with generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP)"' is used on one or more items." 2  A CPA
years then ended. These financial statements are the responsibility of the Association's
management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial statements
based on our audit.
We conducted our audits in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable
assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement. An
audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and
disclosures in the financial statements. An audit also includes assessing the accounting
principles used and significant estimates made by management, as well as evaluating the
overall financial statement presentation. We believe that our audits provide a reasonable
basis for our opinion.
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly, in all
material respects, the financial position of__ as of December 31, __ and
the results of its operations and its cash flows for the years then ended in conformity
with generally accepted accounting principles.
Our audits were made for the purpose of forming an opinion on the basic financial
statements taken as a whole. The schedule of research and development expense for the
years ended December 31, _ is presented for purposes of additional analysis
and is not a required part of the basic financial statements. Such information has been
subjected to the auditing procedures applied in the audit of the basic financial statements
and, in our opinion, is fairly stated in all material respects in relation to the basic
financial statements taken as a whole.
Siegfried, Crandall, Vos & Lewis, P.C., Kalamazoo, Michigan 49008.
107. Hagen, supra note 68, at 69; 1 AICPA STANDARDS, supra note 36, AU § 411 (1993).
108. Hagen, supra note 68, at 69. See generally Crandall Interview, supra note 7.
109. Hagen, supra note 68, at 69; 1 AICPA STANDARDS, supra note 36, AU §§ 411.01-.04
(1993)
110. Hagen, supra note 68, at 69. An unqualified opinion is labeled as a short form opinion
because of its brevity. Id.
111. 1 AICPA STANDARDS, supra note 36, AU §§ 508.38-.69 (1992). The standards and
principles used in performing audits and other CPA services were formulated and approved by the
American Institute for CPAs (AICPA). The AICPA is a national organization. The AICPA bylaws
state the organization's goals and purposes. WIXON ET AL., supra note 1, at 26-31; 2 AICPA
STANDARDS, supra note 36, BL § 101 (1988). GAAP and Generally Accepted Auditing Standards
(GAAS) were developed to give the public accounting profession standards and guidelines that offer
the client continuity in the performance of audits. See 1 AICPA STANDARDS, supra note 36, U.S.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 3 [1994], Art. 6
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Auditing Standards (1988).
RULE 203.01 -Accounting Principles. A member shall not (1) express an opinion or
state affirmatively that the financial statements or other financial data of any entity are
presented in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or (2) state that
he or she is not aware of any material modifications that should be made to such
statements or data in order for them to be in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles, if such statements or data contain any departure from an
accounting principle promulgated by bodies designated by Council to establish such
principles that has a material effect on the statements or data taken as a whole. If,
however, the statements or data contain such a departure and the member can
demonstrate that due to unusual circumstances the financial statements or data would
otherwise have been misleading, the member can comply with the rule by describing the
departure, its approximate effects, if practicable, and the reasons why compliance with
the principle would result in a misleading statement.
2 AICPA STANDARDS, supra note 36, ET § 203.01 (1993). The auditing standards are listed below:
AU § 150
.01 Auditing standards differ from auditing procedures in that "procedures" relate to
acts to be performed, whereas "standards" deal with measures of the quality of the
performance of those acts and the objectives to be attained by the use of the procedures
undertaken. Auditing standards as distinct from auditing procedures concern themselves
not only with the auditor's professional qualities but also with the judgment exercised
by him in the performance of his audit and in his report.
.02 The generally accepted auditing standards as approved and adopted by the
membership of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants are as follows:
General Standards
1. The audit is to be performed by a person or persons having adequate
technical training and proficiency as an auditor.
2. In all matters relating to the assignment, an independence in mental
attitude is to be maintained by the auditor or auditors.
3. Due professional care is to be exercised in the performance of the audit
and the preparation of the report.
Standards of Field Work
1. The work is to be adequately planned and assistants, if any, are to be
properly supervised.
2. A sufficient understanding of the internal control structure is to be
obtained to plan the audit and to determine the nature, timing, and extent
of tests to be performed.
3. Sufficient competent evidential matter is to be obtained through
inspection, observation, inquiries, and confirmations to afford a reasonable
basis for an opinion regarding the financial statements under audit.
Standards of Reporting
1. The report shall state whether the financial statements are presented in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
2. The report shall identify those circumstances in which such principles
have not been consistently observed in the current period in relation to the
preceding period.
3. Informative disclosures in the financial statements are to be regarded as
reasonably adequate unless otherwise stated in the report.
4. The report shall either contain an expression of opinion regarding the
financial statements, taken as a whole, or an assertion to the effect that an
opinion cannot be expressed. When an overall opinion cannot be expressed,
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gives a qualified opinion if an improperly accounted for item is included that
would have a material, but not pervasive, effect on the financial statements." 3
the reasons therefore should be stated. In all cases where an auditor's name
is associated with financial statements, the report should contain a clear-cut
indication of the character of the auditor's work, if any, and the degree of
responsibility the auditor is taking.
.03 These standards to a great extent are interrelated and interdependent. Moreover,
the circumstances which are germane to a determination of whether one standard is met
may apply equally to another. "Materiality" and "audit risk" underlie the application
of all the standards, particularly the standards of field work and reporting.
.04 The concept of materiality is inherent in the work of the independent auditor.
There should be stronger grounds to sustain the independent auditor's opinion with
respect to those items which are relatively more important and with respect to those in
which the possibilities of material misstatement are greater than with respect to those of
lesser importance or those in which the possibility of material misstatement is remote.
For example, in an entity with few, but large, accounts receivable, the accounts
individually are more important and the possibility of material misstatement is greater
than in another entity that has a great number of small accounts aggregating the same
total. In industrial and merchandising enterprises, inventories are usually of great
importance to both financial position and results of operations and accordingly may
require relatively more attention by the auditor than would the inventories of a public
utility company. Similarly, accounts receivable usually will receive more attention than
prepaid insurance.
.05 The consideration of audit risk has an important bearing on the nature of the audit.
Cash transactions are more susceptible to irregularities than inventories, and the work
undertaken on cash may therefore have to be carried out in a more conclusive manner
without necessarily implying a greater expenditure of time. Arm's-length transactions
with outside parties are usually subjected to less detailed scrutiny than intercompany
transactions or transactions with officers and employees, where the same degree of
disinterested dealing cannot be assumed. The effect of internal control structure on the
scope of an audit is an outstanding example of their influence on auditing procedures of
a greater or lesser degree of risk of misstatement; i.e., the more effective the internal
control structure, the less the degree of control risk.
Services Other than Examinations of Financial Statements
.06 In addition to audits of financial statements, the ten generally accepted auditing
standards, to the extent that they are relevant in the circumstances, apply to all other
services governed by Statements on Auditing Standards unless the Statement specifies
otherwise. [As amended, effective after August 31, 1982, by Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 43.]
1 AICPA STANDARDS, supra note 36, U.S. Auditing Standards, AU § 150 (1989).
In addition, GAAP and GAAS are legally recognized standards that prevent the auditor from
voluntarily escaping liability. CPAs can also limit their liability during an audit by not allowing the
issuance of certain forms of opinion. Hagen, supra note 68, at 70-72.
112. 1 AICPA STANDARDS, AU § 410 (1993):
.01 The first standard of reporting is:
The report shall state whether the financial statements are presented in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
Opinion qualifications are usually stated in the opinion paragraph. 1 AICPA STANDARDS, AU § 508
.38-.66 (1992). See generally WIXON ET AL., supra note 1, at 26-28.
113. Hagen, supra note 68, at 70.
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The reasons for giving a qualified opinion include: lack of competent evidential
matter, restrictions on the scope of an auditor's examination, departures from
GAAP in the financial statements, and changes in applied accounting principles
or significant uncertainties which may affect the financial statements."14  A
CPA renders an adverse opinion if the reasons stated above have a material and
pervasive effect on the financial statements such that the fairness of presentation
is destroyed." 5
A CPA uses a disclaimer opinion to avoid responsibility for the financial
statements." 6 The disclaimer states that the CPA does not express an opinion
on the financial statements."' A disclaimer of opinion can only be issued if
the CPA cannot objectively identify that the financial statements are in
accordance with GAAP, and cannot be issued merely to avoid liability.118
Opinion letters only assert an opinion ' and are not an express
warranty.2 ° Unfortunately, the legal community and judiciary appear to have
conveniently treated the opinion letter (the audit) as an express warranty that
imposes strict liability on the auditor. 2' One commentator has stated that "an
114. Hagen, supra note 68, at 70-71.
115. 1 AICPA STANDARDS, supra note 36, AU § 508.67-.69 (1988). An adverse opinion states
that the financial statements do not present fairly the client's current or changed financial position
and are not in conformity with GAAP. 1 AICPA STANDARDS, supra note 36, AU § 508.67 (1988).
116. Hagen, supra note 68, at 71; see generally 1 AICPA STANDARDS, supra note 36, AU §
504.05 (1993).
117. Hagen, supra note 68, at 71; 1 AICPA STANDARDS, supra note 36, AU § 504.05-13
(1993), AU § 508.70-.72 (1988).
118. Hagen, supra note 68, at 72. For an example of a case where a court acknowledged and
based its dismissal of state claims of securities law violations, fraud, and negligence on a firm's
proper use of disclaimers and qualifications, see In re VMS Limited Partnership Sec. Litig., 976
F.2d 362 (7th Cir. 1992). For a brief summary of this case and its impact, see Fraud Charges
Against Pannell Kerr Forster Dismissed, J. ACCr., April 1993, at 20.
119. Webster's Dictionary definition of opinion is: "Opinion-la: a view,judgment, or appraisal
formed in the mind about a particular matter ... .2a: belief stronger than impression and less strong
than positive knowledge ... . WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 828 (9th ed.
1991).
120. WIXON ET AL., supra note l,-at 26-7.
121. While stating its reasons for rejecting Ultramares v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931),
the court in Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand declared: "To require a plaintiff in such
a situation to be in privity with the defendant-accountant ignores the modem verity that accountants
make reports on which people other than their clients foreseeably rely in the ordinary course of
business." Haddon View Investment Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 436 N.E.2d 212, 214 (Ohio
1982). See Rosenblumv. Adler, 461 A.2d. 138 (N.J. 1983). The Rosenblum court maintained that
a defective audit was similar to a defective product, and stated:
If recovery for defective products may include economic loss, why should such loss not
be compensable if caused by negligent misrepresentation? The maker of the product and
the person making a written representation with intent that it be relied upon are,
respectively, impliedly holding out that the product is reasonably fit, suitable and safe
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audit report is not designed to guarantee the accuracy of the financial statements
prepared by management, but only to attest to the fairness of management's
presentation. " "  Some courts have treated audit reports and opinions as
express warranties, thereby making the auditors liable to both the client and
third parties.
IV. HISTORICAL APPLICATION OF THIRD-PARTY LIABILITY
IN PUBLIC ACCOUNTING SUITS
The history of the courts' expansion of third-party liability in public
accounting suits covers a relatively short period of time in the lengthy history
of public accounting. However, perhaps a more alarming concern is the
dramatic upward trend in the courts' severity and strictness of interpretation and
application of accountants' liability."2 Courts have jumped from the equitable
strict privity rule12' of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche'" to the very broad
foreseeability standard in the 1983 decision of Rosenblum v. Adler."
The courts have imposed the legal theory of foreseeability in the area of
and that the representation is reasonably sufficient, suitable and accurate.
Id. at 147.
In acknowledging how many courts feel about the accounting profession, the Monco court
stated that "the accounting profession is sophisticated and obligated to provide the public with
accurate financial information." First Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Monco Agency Inc., 911 F.2d
1053, 1059 (5th Cir. 1990). The Arthur Young Court stated:
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation's financial status,
the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any employment
relationship with the client. The independent public accountant performing this special
function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporations' creditors and stockholders, as well
as to the investing public. This "public watchdog" function demands that the accountant
maintain total independence from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity
to the public trust.
United States v. Arthur Young& Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984). But cf Ebke, supra note 32.
Ebke states that "auditing is an art, not a science." Id. at 683.
122. Gossman, supra note 35, at 233. "[Tihe independent auditor does not control the client's
accounting records and processes. . . . The auditor, however, is an outsider; he is never as close
to the accounting processes as the client's general and accounting officers who govern these
processes." Gormley, supra note 37, at 552.
123. See supra part I. Because cases brought against CPAs under RICO are criminal charges,
this note will be limited to discussing primarily common law liability actions and a few SEC cases.
124. Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen& Co., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985). In Credit
Alliance, the privity requirement in Ultramares was expanded to include third parties enjoying a
relationship with the accountants that "sufficiently approaches privity." Id.
125. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
126. Rosenblum v. Adler, 461 A.2d. 138 (N.J. 1983).
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professional negligence to assure just and fair results in litigation.'27
However, courts should not be so quick to overlook legal rules, such as privity,
just because the rules represent a rigid formal approach to imposing liability.
A legal system needs rigid rules to delineate the boundaries of a legal action, as
well as flexibility to apply these rules. In addition, courts need to step back and
ask if foreseeability, although a working compatible standard in some areas of
tort law, is the most equitable and just standard when applied to public
accounting suits.
The foreseeability standard and the Restatement standard"2 place a
disproportionate burden of liability on CPAs by ignoring pre-contractual
relations between the client and the CPAs and expanding the classes of third
parties who might recover. The Restatement standard also removes
predictability from court decisions regarding accountants' liability because courts
have the discretion to apply the standard either narrowly or broadly."3
The courts originally applied the foreseeability standard and the Restatement
standard to provide an incentive for the CPA to tighten and improve auditing
controls and procedures and to assert more care when undertaking an audit. 3 '
However, time has shown that these doctrines have failed their purpose and are
destroying the CPA profession, the very group the doctrines are intended to
regulate.132 Courts, however, continue to justify extending CPAs' liability on
the premise that public accounting firms can best bear the loss. 33  Many
127. For a discussion about the Cardozo and Andrews approaches to applying foreseeability and
their application to CPA cases, see Willis Hagen 11, Accountants Common Law Negligent Liability
to Third Parties, COL. Bus. L. REV. 181, 200-06 (1988); see also Gossman, supra note 35, at 222-
28 (discussing the foreseeability standard and judicial acceptance).
128. See supra note 127.
129. The Restatement standard is similar to the foreseeability standard applied in Rosenblum.
Under the Restatement standard, an accountant's liability is limited to the class of persons who are
foreseen to rely upon the negligent misrepresentation of the audit. This limitation on the class of
persons requires that the class be a known and intended class. Gormley, supra note 37, at 530, 551.
130. Id.
131. See Wiener, supra note 68, at 256; Rosenblum v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983);
Gossman, supra note 35, at 238.
132. For the doctrines' effects on the CPA profession, see ANDERSEN ET AL., supra note 1,
at 1-7. But see Wiener, supra note 68, at 250. "There is no empirical data to suggest the
accounting profession has withered as a result of increased liability. To the contrary, accountancy
as a business seems to have flourished. The fees charged by firms have risen commensurate with
the 'accountants' increased sophistication, and the complexity and risk associated with their
endeavors.'" Id. Keep in mind, however, that Wiener's article was written in 1983. For a recent
study demonstrating findings opposite of Wiener's opinion, see AUS Consultants, supra note 3.
133. Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.C.R.I. 1968); Rosenblum, 461 A.2d
at 138. See also Bilek, supra note 94, at 698. Bilek concluded that the third party should bear the
loss, and noted: "Accountants, rather than third parties, should bear the loss only if such imposition
minimizes the costs to society.- Id.
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courts view CPAs to be in the best position to spread the costs of imposed
liability by purchasing insurance or increasing service rates. " Unfortunately,
the insurance industry is not in sync with the courts, and CPAs have
encountered increased difficulty in obtaining liability insurance.' If CPAs
are fortunate enough to obtain insurance, many times the coverage is less than
anticipated and the premium rates are astronomical.1
36
The absence of predictability in legal decisions leaves accountants in an
unfair position of uncertainty as to when and how courts will impose liability.
The unpredictability in the law regarding liability rules in public accounting
cases places CPAs at a disadvantage to protect themselves legally. Although no
area of the law is entirely predictable, the area of public accountants' liability
is especially tenuous. Courts need to apply standards consistently in public
accounting suits so that uniformity and predictability may result. In order for
courts to apply the standards consistently, the standards will have to be more
objective than subjective. A review of some of the landmark decisions and the
standards applied in those cases, along with a discussion of recently decided
cases involving the problem of expanded accountants' liability, will serve to
explain and impress upon the reader the seriousness of the situation relative to
the accounting profession.
A. The Privity Requirement
The common law requirement that privity exist between two parties before
liability can be found was first realized in the English case of Winterbottom v.
Wright.'37 In that case, a passenger was injured while riding in a mail coach.
The passenger sued the mail coach company for negligently manufacturing a
wheel, which broke and caused the accident. The court held that the passenger
did not have a cause of action because of the lack of privity between the
passenger and the mail coach company.' The court reasoned that allowing
the plaintiff, a third party, to bring a suit for negligence would extend liability
to be found in almost any circumstance.' 39
134. Rusch, 284 F. Supp. at 85; Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 138. But see Bily v. Arthur Young
& Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992). The Bily court stated that "it might be doubted whether auditors
are the most efficient absorbers of the losses from inaccuracies in financial information." Id. at 766.
See also Siliciano, supra note 33, at 1973 (stating that investors as a class are a "broad social base
upon which the costs of accounting errors can be spread"). See also Bilek, supra note 94, at 705-07
(supporting a theory that limits accountants' liability).
135. See infra notes 205-16 and accompanying text.
136. ANDERSEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 3; see infra note 211 (chart).
137. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
138. Id.
139. Id.
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Historically, privity has been recognized as a necessary element in
maintaining a suit in contract law."4  Prior to the extension of tort law,
accounting suits were brought under the theory of contract law because of the
existing contract between the auditor and the client. 4 ' As courts began to
expand CPAs' liability to outside third parties other than the client, the privity
rule had to be replaced with a more flexible and subjective rule.'42 Although
Winterbottom set out the privity requirement in a contract action, courts have
misinterpreted the holding to mean that an action in tort was also precluded from
being brought by a third party.
43
Later, the doctrine of privity in Lawrence v. Fox" was expanded so that
privity, as applied in contract law, included persons who were clearly designated
as beneficiaries of a promise. In 1922, the New York Court of Appeals decided
the case of Glanzer v. Shepard145 and expanded liability to a seller who mis-
weighed beans and certified the weight to a buyer. The Glanzer court found
liability because the transmission of the certificate was the "end and aim of the
transaction."" This expansion of liability was short lived, however, because
in 1931, the holding in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche curbed this expansion of
liability. 147
The Ultramares case involved an action for negligent misrepresentation and
fraudulent misrepresentation against an accounting firm."' The defendant-
accounting firm was hired by Stem & Co. (Stem) to prepare balance sheets
specifically at its request and for its use. The plaintiff, a lending institution, lent
funds to Stem relying on the balance sheet figures prepared by the
140. CORBIN, supra note 70, at 778.
141. E.g., East Grand Forks v. Steele, 141 N.W. 181 (Minn. 1913).
142. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
143. KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, at 668.
144. Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (n.d.), cited in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E.
441,445 (N.Y. 1931).
145. Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
146. Id.
147. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 441. The Glanzer court's holding has since been cited by various
courts (see, e.g., Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.C.R.I. 1968); Security Pac.
Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 597 N.E.2d 1080, 1087 (N.Y. 1992) (claiming, by
the dissent, that the majority applied Glanzer)) who wish to depart from the later decision in
Ultramares, which reinstates the requirement of privity in extending third-party liability. Glanzer
and Ultramares are conflicting decisions that Judge Cardozo decided. However, the unusualness
of these cases is minimized because Ultramares, the latter of the two cases, does not overrule
Glanzer, but rather, distinguishes it on technical factual grounds. Although a valid distinction could
be drawn from the two cases, it appears as though Judge Cardozo may have had a difficult time
admitting that Glanzer may have been wrongly decided.
148. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
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defendant. 49  Stem later went bankrupt, and the lender sued the accounting
firm. "
The Ultramares court held that "ensuing liability for negligence is to be
enforced between the parties by whom the contract has been made."' The
Ultramares court distinguished Glanzer by reasoning that the defendant's service
in Glanzer was primarily for the information of a third person, an indirect party
to the contract, and was only incidentally for the benefit of the formal
promisee.'52 In the Ultramares case, however, the court reasoned that the
service was performed primarily for the benefit of the Stem corporation, and
was only incidentally for the use of those whom Stem might later involve.153
The Ultramares court reasoned that the extension of liability to third parties
would expand the field of liability for negligent speech so that it would be nearly
the same as liability for fraud."u The court also considered the possible
effects of an expanded liability theory to other similarly situated professions such
as title companies and lawyers.'55 The Ultramares court further emphasized
the fact that a reasonable business person receiving a certificate without paying
for it, and receiving it as one of many possible investors, would look for more
outside assurance than the audit. 56
The Ultramares holding requiring privity of contract to extend liability to
accountants was modified in Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen.'57 In
Credit Alliance, the court held that an accountant cannot be liable in negligence
to a non-contractual party unless the accountant was aware that the financial
statements were to be used for a particular purpose in furtherance of which a
known party was intending to rely. " The Credit Alliance court further held
that the known party and the accountant must be linked by some portion of the
accountant's conduct."' The link between the accountant and the known party
demonstrates the accountant's understanding and awareness that the party relied
on the financial reports. " The court further held that for liability to attach
to an accountant in a negligence action, the accountant and the party must have
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 448.
152. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 446 (N.Y. 1931).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 441.
156. Id. at 448.
157. Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen, 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 110.
160. Id. at 118.
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a relationship that "sufficiently approaches privity." 6 ' Although Credit
Alliance expanded the Ultramares requirement of strict privity, the Ultramares
privity requirement is still basically intact after the Credit Alliance
modification. 62
B. The Restatement of Torts Standard
Ultramares was the standard that courts used when determining the
existence of third-party liability, until the Restatement Second of Torts was
drafted in the 1960s.'" The Restatement created an alternative test for
determining third-party liability. The Restatement extended an auditor's liability
for negligence to an identified narrow group, but not necessarily to the specific
membership within that group. '6 The Restatement only required a third party
to be a member of a limited group whose existence is known to the auditor."
The Restatement's standard is not problematic; rather, the courts' interpretation
and application has led to a range of conflicting decisions that has tended to
expand the auditor's liability.'"
Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin' 67 was one of the first cases to apply the
Restatement standard. The Rusch court held that in a negligence action, an
accountant should be liable for careless financial misrepresentation relied on by
actually foreseen and limited classes of persons.'" In arriving at its decision,
the Rusch court considered and dismissed the Ultramares decision by
161. Id. at 119.
162. The modification of the privity requirement in Credit Alliance was instrumental in
reversing an earlier case. See Westpac Banking Corp. v. Deschamps, 484 N.E.2d 1351 (N.Y.
1985).
163. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
164. Id.; see, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Monco Agency, Inc., 911 F.2d 1053,
1059-60 (5th Cir. 1990).
165. Gossman, supra note 35, at 218. "IT]he Restatement limits the persons to whom he owes
a duty to his client, to intended identifiable beneficiaries and to any unidentified member of the
intended classes of beneficiaries. The only extension in the Restatement beyond Ultramares and
Glanzer appears to be that the auditor need not know the identity of the beneficiaries if they belong
to an identifiable group for whom the information was intended to be furnished." Rosenblum v.
Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 145 (N.J. 1983).
166. E.g., Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992). For a court's different
application of the Restatement, see Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 822 S.W.2d 592
(Tenn. 1991).
167. Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.C.R.I. 1968). Rusch was decided in
1968, and excluding Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958), most courts had adhered to the
Ultramares rule regarding the requirement for limited privity. Since the Rusch decision, a vast
number of states have applied the Restatement standard. Gossman, supra note 35, at 219. For a
discussion and listing of other cases applying the Restatement standard, see Accountants Not Liable
to Investors in Company, LAw. ALERT, Oct. 12, 1992, at 16.
168. Rusch, 284 F. Supp. at 92-93.
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distinguishing the case on its facts." The Rusch court identified the plaintiff
as a "member of an undefined, unlimited class of remote lenders and potential
equity holders not actually foreseen but only foreseeable.""7 The Rusch court
identified with the holding in the Glanzer case and the tentatively proposed
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 and held that the plaintiff could not recover
against the defendant-accountants. 171 An interesting aspect of the Rusch case
is that the court appeared to have left open the possibility of applying full limits
of foreseeability to accountants for negligent misrepresentation. "
Biakanja v. IrvingY" decided by the California Supreme Court in 1958,
was the first case to break away from the Ultramares decision. Biakanja
considerably expanded third-party liability in negligence actions. 74 Although
169. Id. at 91.
170. Id.
171. Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 91, 92 (D.C.R.I. 1968).
172. Id. at 93.
173. 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958).
174. Id. Although the Biakanja court held that a balancing test is required when deciding the
existence of third-party liability, other authorities have classified this case as one applying the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552. Accountants Not Liable to Investors in Company, supra note
167, at 16.
How the Courts Are Split
1. Courts holding that an auditor is liable only to its own clients:
Alabama Colonial Bank of Alabama v. Ridley & Schwiegert, 551 So. 2d 390
(Ala. 1989).
Colorado Stephens Indus., Inc. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357 (10th Cir.
1971).
Delaware McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979).
Idaho Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp of Idaho, 772 P.2d 720
(Idaho 1989).
Indiana Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1991).
Nebraska Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Kennedy & Coe, 441 N.W.2d 180 (Neb.
1989).
New York Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen, 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y.
1985).
Pennsylvania Landell v. Lybrand, 107 A. 783 (Pa. 1919).
2. Courts adopting the Restatement view (liability to clients and known third parties):
Florida First Florida Bank, N.A. v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla.
1990).
Georgia Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198 (Ga. 1987).
Iowa Pahre v. Auditor of State, 422 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1988).
Kentucky Ingram Indus., Inc. v. Nowicki, 527 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ky. 1981).
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the case did not involve an action against an auditor or public accountant, the
rule of law set forth was later applied in public accounting cases.' The
Biakanja court held that when determining if a defendant will be held liable to
a third party not in privity, a question of policy arises and involves a balancing
of factors.'716 The factors that the court considered were: "the extent to which
the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to
him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing future
harm."" The court reconciled its holding with Glanzer by stating that the
"end and aim" of the transaction was to provide the service to the plaintiff."
The Biakanja court applied a balancing test that approached the foreseeability
Louisiana First Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Monco Agency, Inc., 911 F.2d
1053 (5th Cir. 1990).
Michigan Law Offices of Lawrence J. Stockier, P.C. v. Rose, 436 N.W.2d 70
(Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
Minnesota Bonhiver v. Graff, 248 N.W.2d 291 (Minn. 1976).
Missouri Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1973).
Montana Thayer v. Hicks, 793 P.2d 784 (Mont. 1990).
New Hampshire Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 451 A.2d 1308 (N.H.
1982).
Ohio Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 436 N.E.2d 212
(Ohio 1982).
Rhode Island Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.C.R.I. 1968).
Tennessee Bethlehem Steel Corp v. Ernst & Whinney, 822 S.W.2d 592 (Tenn.
1991).
Texas Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James. 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.
1987).
Washington Haberman v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 744 P.2d 1032
(Wash. 1987).
West Virginia First Nat'l Bank v. Crawford, 386 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1989).
3. Courts holding that an auditor is liable to anyone who may foresecably rely on a
report:
Mississippi Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315
(Miss. 1987).
New Jersey Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983).
Wisconsin Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis.
1983).
Id.
175. International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr. 218
(Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1986), overruled by Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
176. Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958).
177. Id.
178. Id.
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Many states have since followed the Rusch court's or the Biakanja court's
lead and have applied the Restatement standard when determining whether third-
party liability can be extended to public accountants."ln One problem with the
Restatement standard is that the courts are given a large amount of discretion to
place more weight on some factors than on others.'' This discretion creates
an inconsistency in judgments due to the subjectivity of the application of the
test. Some courts decided that the Restatement standard did not provide
sufficient protection for the plaintiff and instead applied the foreseeability
standard.
C. Foreseeability Standard
A court first applied unlimited foreseeability in the 1983 case of Rosenblum
v. Adler."n In Rosenblum, the plaintiff alleged that he had relied on audited
financial statements of Giant Stores Corporation, which were prepared by the
defendant, Touche Ross & Co. Based on his reliance of Touche's audit, the
plaintiff claimed to have sold his business to Giant, and in return received Giant
stock."i 3 Public trading of Giant's stock ceased after a discovery that Giant
had committed fraud by manipulating its books, and the stock became
worthless.' Because of plaintiffs reliance on the audit, the Rosenblum court
held that when an independent auditor gives an opinion without a limitation as
to whom the client may disseminate the financial statements, the auditor has a
duty to all who should reasonably be foreseeable as recipients of the information
from the client, provided that the recipients rely on the information pursuant to
the business purposes of the opinion."5
The Rosenblum court reasoned that because Touche's audit did not contain
any limitation as to dissemination, it was reasonably foreseeable that Giant
would distribute the audit to further its business and that Touche had placed the
audit into the economic stream."8 6 Therefore, Touche was responsible for its
179. Id. For an application of the Biakanja balancing standard, see Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v.
Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
180. Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958). See supra note 174 (cases in chart under
both Restatement section and foresceability section).
181. E.g., First Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Monco Agency, Inc., 911 F.2d 1053, 1062 (5th
Cir. 1990) (rejecting an attempt to broaden Louisiana's application of the Restatement and clarifying
Louisiana's narrow interpretation regarding the Restatement's parameters).
182. Rosenblum v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983).
183. Id. at 140.
184. Id. at 138.
185. Id. at 153.
186. Id. at 154-55.
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careless misrepresentations, and owed a duty to those parties who justifiably
relied on the audit.'87 Although the court's holding was far reaching, the
court's dicta indicated that the classification of recipients would be limited and
would not include stockholders who purchased stock after the audit's
preparation, or institutional investors or portfolio managers who did not obtain
the financial statements from the client.' However, in justifying imposing
the broad doctrine of foreseeability, the Rosenblum court stated that the
defendant's ignorance as to the financial statements' precise use would not
eliminate the auditor's obligation. 8 9
Shortly after the Rosenblum decision was handed down, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court decided Citizens State Bank v. 7mm, Schmidt & Co. 90 In
7mm, the court held that an accountant may be liable to a third party not in
privity for negligently preparing an audit report.' 9' The accountant's liability
extends to the foreseeable injuries resulting from the negligent preparation of the
audit unless the court decides, based on the specific facts of a case, that as a
matter of public policy, recovery should be denied." Wisconsin was the
second state to judicially apply the foreseeability standard to extend accountants'
liability to third parties.' The Timm court reasoned that Wisconsin's
fundamental principle of negligence law "is that a tortfeasor is fully liable for
all foreseeable consequences of his act except as those consequences are limited
by policy factors. "' After examining the Ultramares privity standard and the
Restatement standard, the court stated that the Restatement's effect of limiting
liability to certain third parties was too restrictive in its policy factors, and that
the accountants' liability to third parties would be determined according to the
accepted principles of Wisconsin's negligence law.'95
Four years later, the Supreme Court of Mississippi also extended the
foreseeability standard to cases determining the liability of accountants to third
parties. In Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., the court
discussed the three standards that courts have used when determining an
accountant's liability to a third party: the Ultramares privity requirement, the
Restatement standard, and the foreseeability standard.' The Commercial
Union court dismissed the possibility of using the Ultramares test because
187. Rosenblum v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 155 (N.J. 1983).
188. Id. at 153.
189. Id. at 155.
190. 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983).
191. Id. at 366.
192. Id.
193. Gormley, supra note 37, at 557.
194. Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Wis. 1983).
195. Id.
196. Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315, 322-23 (Miss. 1987).
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requiring privity is forbidden under Mississippi law. 1" Similarly, the
Commercial Union court dismissed the Restatement approach, stating that the
Restatement approach is like the privity requirement because it also draws an
arbitrary limit on the potential class of plaintiffs.' The Commercial Union
court ultimately held that "an independent auditor is liable to reasonably
foreseeable users of the audit, who request and receive a financial statement
from the audited entity for a proper business purpose, and who then
detrimentally rely on the financial statement, suffering loss, proximately caused
by the auditor's negligence."" 9 The Commercial Union court reasoned that
this approach would simultaneously protect third parties, who request and rely
on the financial statements, and the auditor from an unlimited number of
potential users who may read a published financial statement.0  The
Commercial Union court further recognized the auditor's right to limit the
dissemination of the opinion in a separate agreement with the client.2 '
Thus far, three states have judicially implemented the unlimited
foreseeability standard when extending third-party liability to public
accountants.m Additionally, many of the states that have adopted the
Restatement standard have interpreted and applied the test quite liberally. 3
The disparaging results of the courts' decisions to expand liability in public
accounting suits have directly affected how public accounting firms are now
doing business, which has ultimately affected the United States's economy.20 4
197. Id. at 321.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 322.
200. Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315, 320-23 (Miss. 1987).
201. Id. at 323.
202. See supra note 174 (the cases under the Foreseeability section).
203. See supra note 174 (the cases under the Restatement section).
204. Increases in accounting services due to the expansion of third-party liability cause price
increases in the finance, insurance, and business service sectors. As a result of legal, accounting,
and investment costs rising due to increased malpractice insurance costs, business service price levels
increased 0.25%, and finance and insurance services price levels increased 0.54%. AUS
Consultants, supra note 3, at 9. The higher capital costs cause a decrease in business investment,
which produces a loss of output. In return, the lower output will cause an increase in inflation.
Due to the impact of scapegoat litigation, the entire economy, measured by the GNP deflator,
will be 0.3% higher by 1996. Id. In addition, the increased cost of legal, accounting, and
investment banking services, due to increased insurance costs, will raise the cost of new investments
more than 1.0% annually from 1992 to 1996. Id. at 7. The effect that scapegoat litigation will have
on the cost of capital will be to increase the costs of raising small amounts of equity capital more
than the cost of large issues.
The effect of scapegoat litigation on international competitiveness and the trade imbalance is
dramatic. U.S. manufacturinghas the highest level of productivity losses due to scapegoat litigation.
Between 1992 and 1996, almost 40% of the total reduction in output caused by scapegoat litigation
will be in the manufacturing sector. Id. at 13. The reduction in business investment, and therefore
the associated decrease in productivity growth, adversely affect the U.S. manufacturers domestically
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V. CURRENT PROBLEMS OF EXTENDING LIABILrrY TO ACCOUNTANTS
A. Summary Of Accountants' Problems
Liability insurance costs and limited availability of insurance coverage are
two reasons that demonstrate the necessity for limiting third-party liability to
accountants. CPAs' liability insurance costs have continued to increase
dramatically each year that tort reform in this area has been ignored. 5
Insurance premiums and deductibles have increased, and coverage has
decreased.' The basic liability insurance policy covers allegations of acts
and errors or omissions by accountants acting within their professional
capacity.' Currently, many policies now cover on a "claims made" or a
"discovery" basis as opposed to the occurrence coverage that was used in the
past.2 m This new coverage only extends to claims reported within policy
effective dates, and occurrence dates are not considered.' Such a change in
coverage severely limits the CPA firm's ability to insure against prior acts that
have not yet been reported.2"'
Several insurance surveys indicate recent startling results as to accounting
and in the competitive international markets.
The "high-tech" areas of the manufacturing sector will be the hardest hit by the scapegoat
litigation because of their dependence on capital and investment. The "high-tech" areas that will
be affected the most are: pharmaceutical, non-electrical machinery and equipment, electrical
machinery and equipment, motor vehicles, aircraft and aerospace, and instruments. Id. at 13-14.
The "high-tech" industries are 34% of the total manufacturing output. Id. at 14. The U.S. trade
balance gains will be threatened by scapegoat litigation because investments in the U.S. will be more
expensive, thereby reducing the productivity growth. The reduction in productivity growth will in
turn make the U.S. products less competitive in the international marketplace. Id. at 7-18.
205. AUS Consultants, supra note 3, at 7; see infra note 206 and accompanying text.
206. James H. Thompson & Laurie J. Henry, Professional Liability Insurance: Go Bare or
Not?, J. ACCT., July 1991, at 111. In response to the number of claims insurance companies now
have to pay out to cover expanding accountants' liability, some insurers are either increasing
insurance premiums or leaving the market. Under many circumstances, insurance may not be
available for CPA firms, even at a high premium rate. Ebke, supra note 32, at 690-91.
207. Thompson & Henry, supra note 206, at 111.
208. Id. at 112.
209. Thompson & Henry, supra note 206, at 111. A "prior acts" exclusion clause that denies
coverage for any work performed before the policy's effective date usually restricts the policy's
scope. If a firm's policy is canceled or the firm does not renew the policy, a gap in coverage can
result. To assure a firm has insurance during the gap periods, most insurance companies offer tail
policies that cover prior acts for earlier unreported claims. Two layers of liability insurance,
primary and excess, are available to accountants. Primary layers consist of a basis policy that states
the risks, people covered, and the policy limits and period. "Additional coverage or endorsements
for special risks or events may be purchased at additional cost." Id. at 112. Firms, depending on
their size, can purchase several primary layer amounts of insurance. Excess layers can extend a
firm's coverage ifa firm's litigation risks exceed the primary layers. Id.
210. Thompson & Henry, supra note 206, at 111.
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firms and their insurance.2 ' One survey indicated that 96% of the surveyed
211. Id. Listed below is a portion of a questionnaire that was mailed in 1990 to 474 randomly
chosen firms throughout the United States. The questionnaire had a 32.5 % response rate,
representing 44 states. The questions dealt with insurance coverage from 1985 to 1989. Id. at 114-
16.
Nature of insurance coverage











































Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 3 [1994], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol28/iss3/6
1994] PUBLIC ACCOUNTING SUITS 1085
firms with fifty or more CPAs reported a 300% increase in liability insurance
premiums since 1985.212 The survey also indicated that smaller firms must
now carry larger amounts of liability insurance coverage.2"3  The high
deductibles for the insurance have caused many smaller firms to forego extra
insurance coverage, which results in the small accounting firms paying many of
the medium-sized court awards themselves."' The median deductible amount
for smaller and medium-sized public accounting firms is currently $240,000, an
amount that is nearly six times the 1985 median amount of $42,000.15 Larger
accounting firms are hit even harder, with deductibles exceeding $25 million for
the first loss.
2 16
These increases in liability insurance costs and expanded liability problems
have caused CPA firms to dramatically raise service costs.217 The increased
service costs are passed on to the client and then to the consumer." The













212. ANDERSEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 3.
213. Id.
214. Id. In addition to the smaller accounting firms having to use firm assets to pay a larger
proportion of the judgments issued against them, the increased insurance costs may put a small
accounting firm totally out of business. Many larger firms, particularly the Big Six, may be able
to absorb or distribute an item of increased cost, but smaller firms do not have the capital base to
absorb or pass on an increased cost. The' outcome of expanding third-party liability in accounting
cases could be to bankrupt the smaller and medium-sized firms, thus leading to a monopoly in the
auditing market. Ebke, supra note 32, at 691.
215. ANDERSEN Er AL., supra note 1, at 3.
216. Id.
217. The Liability Crisis in the United States: Impact on the Accounting Profession, J. ACCT.,
Nov. 1992, at 19.
218. AUS Consultants, supra note 3, at 9.
Faussié: Limiting Liability in Public Accounting Suits: A Desparate Appeal
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1994
1086 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28
be able to effectively spread the cost of liability 9 However, imposing
expanded liability on accountants results in a number of clients being unable to
afford the higher service costs.' Unable to pay the increased cost, many
clients, especially newly established businesses, either have been unable to or
will be unable to obtain audits." Bearing in mind the necessity of audits for
publicly held corporations and those companies wishing to obtain financing, this
inability to pay for an audit has jeopardized business growth in the United
States.2
Investors are skeptical to invest in an enterprise that does not have an
independent audit performed.' This skepticism has led to investors investing
in foreign companies.' The American economy is directly affected when
businesses cannot obtain funding and support from investors.' Additionally,
219. For courts supporting the view that accountants can spread the cost of liability through
purchasing insurance, see International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 223
Cal. Rptr. 218 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1986), overruled by Bily v. Arthur Young& Co., 834 P.2d 745
(Cal. 1992); Rosenblum v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983); Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F.
Supp. 85 (D.C.R.I. 1968). For an economic analysis using the Calabresi model to demonstrate why
accountants should bear the loss in third-party liability cases, see Bilek, supra note 94, at 698.
The accountant also has a better opportunity than the third party to prevent a loss from
occurring. While the accountant can detect irregularities and defalcation through the
auditing process, the third party has very limited access to the corporate records. Since
a third party cannot protect himself from a negligent audit, the risk of loss should be
shifted from the blameless creditor or investor to the accountant, the party who can
prevent the loss by performing a more thorough audit.
Hagen, supra note 127, at 207. Even if an audit could be conducted to provide exact results, the
price of conducting such an audit would not be cost beneficial to either the accountant or the client.
Crandall Interview, supra note 7.
But see Gossman, supra note 35, at 228-29. Courts have premised their notion that the
accountant maintains the superior position to bear the risk of liability on the following three factors:
1) the accounting profession can best spread the risk, (2) insurance is available to accountants, 3)
expanded liability has not had an adverse effect on the accounting profession. Insurance is readily
available to third parties, if not more than to accountants. Id. The further advantage of shifting the
risk to the third parties is the third parties have assumed the risk. Many of the third parties are
institutional creditors and investors who have willingly accepted the risks in anticipation of gain;
therefore, they should accept the losses as well. For a further discussion of why accountants are not
good risk bearers, see id.
220. See ANDERSEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 4; AUS Consultants, supra note 3, at 1, 2, 5;
Gossman, supra note 35, at 229-30.
221. ANDERSEN El AL., supra note 1, at 5; Siliciano, supra note 33, at 1967. "Industry.
cannot afford to pay more for audits because there are fewer audit firms, or have auditing services
disrupted because auditors stop doing business because of liability suits that exceed insurance
coverage." Bob Okell, Against the Liability Crisis, ACCT. TODAY, Nov. 23, 1992, at 3.
222. See ANDERSEN El AL., supra note 1, at 5; AUS Consultants, supra note 3, at 2, 5, 9-18;
see also supra note 204 and accompanying text.
223, See generally ANDERSEN El AL., supra note 1.
224. Id.; see also supra note 204 and accompanying text.
225. See ANDERSEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 4; AUS Consultants, supra note 3, at 13, 18.
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the companies themselves are placed in a financially precarious position, and
many times, must curtail operations or fold.' If this occurs, our economic
growth and capital system are severely impaired. 7
In addition to the market effects, expanding liability has caused CPAs to
engage in an alarming number of out-of-court settlements.' Out-of-court
settlements are no longer an option for many accounting firms, but are a
necessity. The costs of litigation and the high risk for loss at trial have left
settlement the only alternative for accounting firms. Many accounting firms
would rather settle out of court than risk losing even more at trial.'
Unfortunately, this has become the rule for accounting firms, and not the
exception. 3
The past two years have evidenced members of the Big Six accounting
226. Id. The AICPA addresses the needs of the smaller operated public accounting firms by
having a Private Companies Practice Section (PCPS). The PCPS recently began a campaign to
educate the public about the danger of the high legal costs associated with defending a lawsuit and
the filing of meritless lawsuits and the impact on the accounting profession in general, and more
specifically, on the small businesses. To broaden the numbers of those who might be informed, the
PCPS had advertisements offering free educational brochures about the problem placed in several
well-known newspapers and periodicals. PCPS Joins Liability Fight, CPA LETTER, Sept. 1993, at
2. For more information about the PCPS's efforts in this area, see PCPS Addresses Unreasonable
Liability, PRACTICINO CPA; July 1993, at 2; Gary M. Bolinger & Stanton G. Bonta, Legislating
Liability Reform, J. ACCT., July 1993, at 56. For more information on the PCPS survey on small
businesses and liability, see Liability Costs Hurt Small Business, Says PCPS Survey, J. ACCT., Oct.
1993, at 17, 18.
227. The Big Six currently handles the following audits: "494 of the Fortune 500 industrials;
97 of the Fortune 100 fastest growing companies; 99 of the Fortune 100 largest commercial banks;
92 of the top 100 defense contractors; and 195 of the 200 largest insurance companies." ANDERSEN
ET AL., supra note 1, at 4. With statistics like this, it is easy to see how expanded liability affecting
the Big Six will impact the entire national economy. Id.; see generally AUS Consultants, supra note
3. See also supra note 204 and accompanying text.
The effects that the frivolously filed suits against accountants will have on the United States's
ability to compete internationally is evident in the statistic that 60-times more suits are filed in the
United States than in Japan. A company's legal costs constitute a large portion of the budget that
the company could be spending on research and upgrading. Okell, supra note 221, at 3.
228. See supra part I and accompanying notes; see also supra note 7 (chart).
229. Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse, No. 88-34414 (Ariz. Super. Ct., Maricopa
Co. 1992); U.S. Nat'l Bank v. Miniscribe Corp., No. 89-CV-103 1-A (Tex. Dist. Ct., Galveston Co.
1992).
230. Id. "In 1991, total expenditures for settling and defending lawsuits were $477 million-
nine percent of auditing and accounting revenues in the United States." ANDERSEN ET AL., supra
note 1, at 2-3. This figure does not include indirect costs, but only covers costs of legal services,
settlements and judgments, and liability insurance premiums minus insurance reimbursements. The
figure is up from 1990 when the figure was 7.7% of audit and accounting revenues. Reports as of
June 30, 1992, do not indicate a decline in the increased costs. Id.
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firms"' paying huge settlement fees to avoid litigation. 2  In June, 1991,
Coopers & Lybrand was sued for failing to detect a client's shaky fimancial
condition. 3  As a result, Coopers agreed to pay the FDIC a total sum of $20
million over a three year period.?4 In another 1991 case, Ernst & Young
settled a case involving Resolution Trust Corporation for $40 million? 5 The
year 1993 also saw several major out-of-court settlements.2 One recent
major settlement involved the Lincoln Savings & Loan scandal, which produced
an onslaught of suits against members of the Big Six. 7  Thus far, Deloitte
and Touche has paid $7.5 million, Arthur Andersen has paid $22 million, and
Ernst & Young has paid the record sum of $400 million in settlements involving
the Lincoln scandal.'
Although the Big Six and their connection with expanded liability is highly
231. The Big Six is composed of the six largest public accounting firms in the United States:
Arthur Andersen & Co., Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG Peat
Marwick,- and Price Waterhouse. ANDERSEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 1-2.
232. ANDERSEN Er AL., supra note 1, at 2; Domenici, supra note 2, at 1; Standard Chartered
PLC, No. 88-34414; Miniscribe, No. 89-CV-103 I-A.
233. Woolley & Schiller, supra note 3, at 32.
234. Id.
235. For a discussion about out-of-court settlements, see Rick Telberg, E&Y Wins a Round in
Lincoln S&L Failure, ACCT. TODAY, July 22, 1991, at 2.
236. See generally supra notes 5-27 and accompanying text; Geoghan, supra note 5.
237. See generally Cushman, supra note 3; Schmidt, supra note 3; Pickering, infra note 238;
Abraham Briloff, Accountants' Bottom Line: Home Free, NEWSDAY, Jan. 5, 1993, at 69.
238. John Pickering, D&T Settles Lincoln Case for $7.5 Million, ACCT. TODAY, July 6, 1992,
at 5. The Ernst & Young settlement is a global settlement that will relieve E&Y of any all liability
surrounding the S&L scandal. Most of the charges against E&Y were related to the following failed
savings and loans: the Vernon Savings Association of Dallas, the Silverado Banking, the Savings
and Loan Association of Denver, the Western Savings Association of Phoenix, and the Lincoln
Savings and Loan Association of California. Cushman, supra note 3, at Al. Three hundred million
dollars of F&Y's settlement will be covered by the firm's various insurers with the remaining $100
million to be financed from revenue generated over the next four years. Schmidt, supra note 3, at
Al.
Deloitte & Touche has recently attempted to settle with the Resolution Trust Corporation
(RTC) for its involvement in various failed Savings & Loan institutions. However, settlement talks
broke down before Deloitte was able to reach a global settlement, much like the Ernst & Young
$400 million dollar settlement. For a good explanation of the some of the cases that RTC has filed
against Deloitte & Touche, see Ken Rankin, The RTC vs. Deloitte: Failed S&Ls, Disputed Audits,
ACCT. TODAY, July 19, 1993, at 10. The suits that RTC has filed against Deloitte & Touche
(formally Deloitte Haskins & Sells) as a result of the breakdown in the settlement talks amount to
over $1 billion in damages. For more information on the case breakdown, which when added
together equal $1 billion dollars in damages, see Ken Rankin, RTC Hits Deloitte for $1B in Suits,
ACCT. TODAY, July 5, 1993, at 1, 37.
Arthur Andersen recently made an eight-figure settlement with the Resolution Trust
Corporation (RTC) absolving its firm from all professional liability charges made by the RTC. For
more information about Andersen's involvement with various savings and loans and the settlement
reached with the RTC, see Ken Rankin, Feds Absolve Andersen of S&L Liability-For a Price,
ACCT. TODAY, Aug. 23, 1993, at 2.
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publicized, medium-sized and small firms are also suffering the same plight as
the Big Six. 9  Laventhol & Horwath, the seventh-largest accounting firm in
the United States, declared bankruptcy in 1990.' A former CEO of the firm
indicated that the cost of winning, not the cost of losing, cases cost them their
firm." The demise of the seventh-largest accounting firm in the country
caused many other accounting firms to stand up and take notice of the
seriousness of the situation.u 2
B. Accounting Firms React To Increased Liability
Realizing that their internal controls and long-established procedures are not
affording them protection, CPAs are now seeking alternative protection.243
239. See Lochner, supra note 10, at 105.
240. ANDERSEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 3.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Siliciano, supra note 33, at 1963-67; ANDERSEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 4-7; BDO Forges
New Legal Weapon, ACCT. TODAY, Dec. 7, 1992, at 8; C&L Countersues 5 Phar-Mor Execs for
Fraud, AcCT. TODAY, Sept. 21, 1991, at 2. CPAs are taking other self-protectionist measures to
limit their liability. One measure CPAs are taking is to drop a client at the first hint of potential
liability problems. Ernst & Young declined to bid again for International Telecharge's audit. Ernst
claimed that International's increase in net losses and the recently filed suits against the company
caused Ernst to be concerned with a potential liability issue. E&Y Drops Out as Auditor for Dallas
Client, AcCT. TODAY, Nov. 9, 1992, at 20. Schumacher& Associates, Inc., also recently withdrew
its engagement as auditor for Universal Capital Corp. Schumacher voiced a concern over the
company's ability to generate reliable information in its financial statements. Schumacher Drops
Universal Capital as Client, ACCT. TODAY, Nov. 9, 1992, at 20. Deloitte & Touche recently
resigned as the independent accountant for Advanced NMR Systems. Deloitte had pressured
Advanced to investigate certain transactions involving company stock, and after much discussion,
Advanced complied. However, Deloitte added several paragraphs to its report detailing the
uncertainty of the company's ability to market its product. Deloitte Resigns, Demands Probe, AcCT.
TODAY, Nov. 9, 1992, at 20. CPAs are also using clear engagement letters and careful client
screening techniques to reduce their liability. Mark F. Murray, Litigation: When a Client is a
Liability, J. AcCT., Sept. 1992, at 54. Unfortunately, the accountant liability crisis may have
reached a new low. Fearing the chance of being the only defendant left to pay damages, CPAs are
now engaged in suing each other regarding allegedly performed audits. Deloitte recently sued Price
Waterhouse and Ernst & Young for $8 billion in connection with their audits of Bank of Credit and
Commerce International. John Pickering, Price Slammed Over BCCI, Acr. TODAY, Oct. 19,
1992, at 1.
For an explanation of internal auditing, see WIXON ET AL., supra note 1, at 1-5 to -6. For
an in-depth article on the role of internal audit committees, see Braiotta, supra note 60, at 76. The
internal audit committee, although its effectiveness is currently questioned, is one resource that
independent outside auditors can use to help reduce their potential liability when auditing a company.
Auditing Audit Committees: An Education Opportuniyfor Auditors, J. ACCr., June 1992, at 112.
The audit committee was recently identified by the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial
Reporting as "an essential part of any system designed to prevent fraudulent financial reporting"
Id. "The audit committee, with its constant access to the internal auditor and other corporate
personnel, often is the first nonmanagement group to catch a whiff of irregularity. And if it does,
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One protective measure in which CPAs are now engaging is a careful process
of screening clients, which includes learning to identify certain characteristics
in prospective clients that indicate potential liability problems.2'  An
additional protective measure is to compose a clear and specific engagement
letter, 2' one that clearly informs the client as to the services the CPA will
perform, the procedure that will be implemented, and the limitations on those
services.'
it can direct the external auditor to scrutinize the problem, thereby forestalling a faulty audit." Id.
A crucial problem currently existing with most internal audit committees is their lack of
independence.
One likely reason for the lack of attention to independence is the flexibility of New York
Stock Exchange rules for large, publicly held corporations' audit committee
appointments. Even persons with obvious conflicts of interest, including a corporation's
consultants, significant vendors, major lenders and investment bankers as well as
partners of the law firms representing it, can serve on or even chair its audit committee.
Curtis C. Verschoor, Auditing: Benchraarl'ng the Audit Committee, J. ACcM., Sept. 1993, at 59.
Although an obvious leniency exists in not assuring total independence of the corporate internal
auditing committee's members, the banking industry has recently been hit with FDICIA requirements
that "all insured depository institutions with assets of more than $500 million have an independent
audit committee." Id. For more information about recent changes required by the FDICIA and
American Law Institute's (ALI) recommendations for audit committees, see id.
244. Murray, supra note 243, at 54-55. The article lists the following potential liability
characteristics of a client:
I - A company that has present or pending financial or organizational difficulty.
Specific warnings are "[i]nsufficient working capital, an industry experiencing many
business failures, a company with high turnover in key positions[,] . . .management
responsibilities vested in one person when they should be shared by several[,] . . . poor
credit, dependence on a few customers for products or services and companies that
invest other people's money."
2 - A client's involvement in suspicious transactions.
3 - A client's unreasonableness or uncooperativeness.
4 - Other problem characteristics include: "[b]laming the accountant for the company's
financial problems[,] ... [u]nfavorable tax laws and rulings that affect the company as
well as other circumstances beyond the accountant's control[,] . ..vague, guarded
responses to inquiries[,] ... [t]hreats to take the company's business elsewhere[,] ..
. [r]equests for changes in the engagement[,]. .. [flee pressures[,] ... [r]efusal to sign
engagement and representation letters[,] ...[d]emand for risky services[,J ...[and]
[i]ncompatible personality."
Id.
Certain characteristics are more obvious, such as: "[sleeking an auditor toward yearend[,]
[w]eakness in or absence of internal controls[,] .. . [hIack of organization[,] ... [p]oorly
maintained records and collection difficulties[,] . . . [flailure to file income tax returns for several
years[,] . . .[and] [ftrequent involvement in litigation." Id. at 55.
245. Murray, supra note 243, at 55. One consideration that many public accounting firms
should investigate is adding a binding arbitration clause to their engagement letter. While not
limiting liability in public accounting cases, it is one way in which public accountants can reduce
litigation costs.
246. Accountants Not Liable to Investors in Company, supra note 167, at 16.
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An effective client screening process is now imperative prior to a CPA
accepting a new client.4 7 Although CPAs attempt to limit their liability by
drafting "air-tight" engagement letters and other documentation before, during,
and after an audit, courts are still reluctant to enforce the documents as valid,
binding contracts between the contracting parties.2' To improve the screening
process, CPAs have identified several types of businesses that are potential
liability traps,1 9  including high-tech industries and new businesses. 5
Unfortunately, it is these same businesses that need the auditing services the
most to continue operations or to obtain investors.' The unavailability of
auditing services or other professional financial services has caused investors to
look for new investment opportunities in more secure enterprises, and this in
turn has affected the potential growth of our economy. 2
247. Murray, supra note 243, at 55. The following procedures are guidelines for accountants
to use in the client screening process:
1. If the client approaches the practitioner, ask why the client is changing accountants.
2. Visit the potential client's business to determine the condition of its management,
finances and internal controls. Some practitioners require an analysis of all new client's
internal controls.
3. Meet a prospect's accounting and tax personnel to determine financial needs and the
condition of accounting records.
4. Check all potential clients' references to determine their reputation for honesty,
credit history and rating, financial stability, cooperativeness and litigation history,
possible conflicts of interest, management quality, personnel competency, personality
and potential to be sources of new clients.
5. Be aware of high-risk industries. Those in which CPAs are especially vulnerable
to litigation include savings and loans, health care, property and casualty insurance and
not-for-profit organizations....
6. After receiving necessary client authorization, contact the prospect's former
accountant, current attorney, bankers, credit bureaus and current and former business
associates and employees. Inquiries to the Better Business Bureau, the Chamber of
Commerce or trade associations can be especially productive. CPAs should document
all communications.
Id. at 55.
248. See supra note 174 (chart).
249. AUS Consultants, supra note 3, at 13-18; Murray, supra note 243, at 54.
250. Murray, supra note 243, at 54.
251. See AUS Consultants, supra note 3, at 13-14.
252. Lochner, supra note 10, at 105. An additional protective step that CPAs are now finding
necessary to take in order to protect themselves against fraudulently filed suits includes countersuing
the plaintiff. One CPA firm has taken an independent stand and has countersued a plaintiff. This
case involves Phar-Mor drug chain shareholders who filed suit under RICO against Coopers Lybrand
for not discovering fraud by Phar-Mor executives. The Phar-Mor executives allegedly embezzled
company funds and then reported them as nonexistent profits. See generally Woolley & Schiller,
supra note 3. Coopers' engagement letter had warned the client that "attempts at concealment
through collusion and forgery" might prevent the detection of fraud. C&L Countersues 5 Phar-Mor
Execs for Fraud, supra note 243, at 2. Countersuing appears to be a way that CPA firms can turn
the tables on the plaintiff in order to protect themselves. Id. The country's tenth-largest public
accounting firm, BDO Seidman, appears to have also taken the counter-offensive and recently
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Some CPAs have found it necessary to combat the imposition of expanded
liability by engaging in risk reduction practices, which include limiting or
foregoing their audit practices altogether. 3  Other accounting firms have
retained their auditing service, but are now "going bare" and not obtaining
liability insurance.2- A recent AICPA survey indicated that forty percent of
accounting firms surveyed are not seeking insurance coverage due to the
unmanageable cost.
5
In summary, the courts' refusal to apply a consistent uniform liability
standard in public accounting cases has caused unavailability and increases in
liability insurance, which has resulted in CPAs taking self-protection measures
that hurt consumers and the economy.25
received the first settlement in a countersuit against its client for fraud. The settlement ends a 14-
year-old counterclaim against BDO's client, Cenco, Inc. BDO Forges New Legal Weapon, supra
note 243, at 8.
253. Long-awaited Liability Reforms Bill Introduced, supra note 4, at 3.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. The Big Six have also decided to take note of the issue of CPA professional legal liability
and have written a Statement of Position. The Statement of Position outlines the current professional
liability problem affecting CPAs, the Big Six's position, and proposed action regarding the problem.
ANDERSEN ET" AL., supra note 1, at 1. The AICPA has also urged reform in this area, and has
written a resolution regarding legal liability. AICPA Board Urges Tort Reform, Endorses Large-
Firm Position Paper, CPA LETTER, Oct. 1992, at 1. Accounting firms, however, are taking an
aggressive stance at the state and federal level by proposing legislation that would curb the tide of
expanding liability in public accounting suits. Currently a few states have adopted laws that limit
liability suits against CPAs. The law in Illinois "eliminates joint liability in negligence cases where
the CPA is found to be less than twenty-five percent responsible for the total damage suffered by
a plaintiff, and bars any recovery by a plaintiff who is more than fifty percent responsible for the
total damages." Survey Shows Extent of Members' Concern Over Legal Liability, CPA LETTER,
July-Aug. 1992, at 1. Governor Jim Edgar signed Illinois Senate Bill 2119 in September, 1992.
Patterson, supra note 19, at 3. More legislative work is being done at the federal level than at the
state level. Proposed federal legislation is currently pending which would involve limiting CPA
liability in SEC lOb-5 suits and would apply proportionate liability when assessing damages. Long-
awaited Liability Reforms Bill Introduced, supra note 4, at 3. The federal legislation is supported
by the Big Six lobbing group, Coalition to Eliminate Abusive Securities Suits, the AICPA, and
investment brokers, who tend to be named as co-defendants in security suits. Pickering, supra note
2, at 2. The AICPA surveyed 5000 accounting firms, including sole practitioners, but not including
large firms. The survey received 1700 responses which indicated the following responses:
47% of respondents believe that their firms' exposure to legal liability has increased
over the past five years, and 54% feel that their firms' exposure will increase over the
next five years. 74% of accounting firms believe that Congress or state legislatures
should act to impose reasonable limitations on accountants' legal liability.
Survey Shows Extent of Members' Concern Over Legal Liability, supra, at 1. For a more complete
discussion, see Litigation Reform Bills Introduced; Drive for Passage Builds, J. ACCT., Nov. 1992,
at 26; AICPA Board Endorsement, J. AcCT., Nov. 1992, at 18. For more information regarding
the proposed federal legislation, see generally Domenici, supra note 2; Sanford, supra note 2. For
a summary of the proposed legislation, see News Report, J. AcCT., Nov. 1992, at 25.
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VI. THE COURTS REACT TO THE PROBLEMS OF EXPANDING
ACCOuNTANTS' LIABILITY
Various state and federal courts have recently begun to recognize how
unjust and unrealistic many court decisions have been that have expanded
accountants' liability in public accounting suits.7 In 1992, several states
issued landmark decisions limiting the liability of accountants for the services
they perform., Three states, California, Texas, and New York, are among the
states that have recently ruled in favor of accountants.
25s
A. Privity Affirmed
One New York case, Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. v. Peat Marwick
Main & Co. , reaffirmed the New York courts' application of the near
privity rule. The court rejected a broader standard that would hold accountants
liable to third parties who merely alleged that they relied on the accountants'
prepared financial statements.' This ruling impacts all states following the
New York courts' application of the near privity rule,"6 and will have a
persuasive effect on those courts that still permit unlimited accountant liability.
In Security Pacific, an institutional lender, Security Pacific Business Credit,
Inc. (SPBC), sued the defendant, Peat Marwick Main & Co., for allegedly
257. E.g., Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992); McGonigle v. Combs, 968
F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 399 (1992); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992). A Maryland appeals court recently held that a client
was barred from recovering against an accountant who failed to discover embezzlement because of
the client's contributory negligence in failing to take appropriate steps to prevent the embezzlement.
Wegad, an accountant, was hired by Howard Street Jewelers. Mr. Wegad was to compile financial
statements and specifically issued an engagement letter disclaiming any duty to disclose fraud or
other irregularities. Although outside of his scope of employment, Wegad informed Howard Street
after cash shortages were discovered. Despite Wegad's limited duties as set forth in the engagement
letter, Howard Street sued him for failing to detect the embezzlement. In ruling for Wegad, the
court of appeals stated that "we do not believe that an accountant's negligent failure to report
shortages completely insulates the client who consistently leaves the company's cash unattended and
fully accessible to all employees and customers." Gilbert v. Howard Street Jewelers, Inc., 605 A.2d
123, 128 (Md. 1993), cited in Client's Negligence Absolves Accountant's Negligence, J. ACCT.,
March 1993, at 21.
258. SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. 1217 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp. v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992); Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc. v. Peat
Marwick Main & Co., 597 N.E.2d 1080 (N.Y. 1992).
259. 597 N.E.2d 1080 (N.Y. 1992).
260. Id. at 1085-87. See also AICPA Brief Aids New York Court in Reaffirming Favorable
Ruling, CPA LETrER, Sept. 1992, at 3.
261. See supra note 174 (chart).
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negligently performing an audit for Top Brass Enterprises, Inc. (Top Brass). 2
SPBC allegedly relied on Peat Marwick's unqualified audit opinion and financial
statements when deciding to loan Top Brass forty million dollars on a fifty
million dollar line of credit.' SPBC allegedly relied on the opinion based on
a ten-minute telephone call that it made to Peat Marwick's audit partner in order
to discuss Top Brass's audit report.'
The Security Pacific court affirmed New York's near privity rule by
reaffirming Credit Alliance and the requirement for an existing relationship
between the accountant and the third party that "sufficiently approaches
privity."' The Security Pacific court held that SPBC did not establish a
relationship between itself and Peat Marwick that sufficiently approached
privity.' The Security Pacific court reasoned that SPBC's reliance on a ten-
minute telephone call did not establish a sufficient privity relationship because
SPBC's inquiries during the call were "limited to generalities that nothing
untoward had been uncovered in the course of the audit and that an unqualified
opinion would issue, certifying the tentative draft which plaintiff had received
from Top Brass itself."" The court further stated that a non-client cannot
impose negligence liability on an accountant by alleging reliance on the audit
report. 2M
The Security Pacific court also recognized an absence of sufficient conduct
to establish a relationship between SPBC and Peat Marwick.' 6 In addition,
the court stressed the observations made by the Credit Alliance court that "if a
lender can secure possible loan recourse against a borrower's auditor by the
simple act of calling the auditor before advancing a loan and announcing reliance
on the auditor's opinion, then every lender's due diligence list will in the future
mandate such a telephone call."2' Additionally, the Security Pacific court
recognized the absence of any evidence showing that Peat Marwick performed
the audit opinion for a specific purpose, other than the SEC's requirement for
262. Securiy Pac., 597 N.E.2d at 1080. Security Pacific claimed that Peat Marwick's
unqualified opinion overstated Top Brass's accounts receivables and merchandise inventory. Id.
263. Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 597 N.E.2d 1080 (N.Y.
1992).
264. Id. at 1082.
265. Id. at 1083.
266. Id.




270. Id. at 1085-86.
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publicly held companies to file audits."'
The New York court's holding was a reaffirmation of its reliance on the
near privity rule and its reluctance to extend accountants' liability in suits that
fall short of the privity requirements.'m This case also demonstrates the New
York court's careful policy considerations when applying a narrow definition of
duty to non-contractual parties.
B. The Restatement Approach Narrowed Further
Although some courts have demonstrated a willingness to adopt the privity
rule, other courts are not willing to limit accountants' liability to the narrow
privity rule.t2 However, a number of courts, recognizing the need for limited
third-party liability in accountant suits, have narrowed their application of the
Restatement standard. Three recent court decisions in Texas, California, and
North Carolina have applied a narrow application of the Restatement
standard.2 4
In 1992, Texas affirmed its application of the Restatement standard in
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) v. Ernst & Young. 5  In this
case, Woods, as the sole owner of Western Capital Corporation (Western),
271. Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 597 N.E.2d 1080,
1085-96 (N.Y. 1992)
272. For an explanation of the recent New York case, Merchant Factors Corp. v. Wolfson,
Kapit, Meizer, Milowsky, Ettinger and Wieseltheir (unreported decision; no citation available), in
which a New York court found privity existed in a public accountant case, see New York Court
Finds Privity Erists in Accountant's Case, J. ACCr., Nov. 1993, at 22. A New York state supreme
court recently ended a 15-year legal battle by finding Coopers & Lybrand innocent of charges
brought against them by Teachers' Insurance & Annuity Association. After Coopers won the $28
million lawsuit, Coopers' general counsel stated, "'This sends a message that sophisticated investors
and lenders who lose money in bad investments can't expect to recover their losses by suing innocent
accounting firms.'" Coopers & Lybrand Wins $28 Million Lawsuit, Accr. TODAY, March 15,
1993, at 4.
273. Kansas recently upheld its strict privity statute in Gillespie v. Seymour. 796 P.2d 1060
(Kan. 1990), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 823 P.2d 782 (Kan. 1991). In Gillespie, trust beneficiaries
sued a trustee for investing trust funds in a company controlled by the trustee's son and husband.
The trust beneficiaries also sued the accountant for the company, alleging negligence and breach of
duty. The court dismissed the action against the accountant because of a lack of privity between the
trust beneficiaries and the accountant. The law, however, does not affect third-party beneficiaries'
rights to sue for breach of trust. Kansas Upholds Strict Priviry Statute, J. ACCT., March 1991, at
27.
274. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992);
Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992); Venturtech 11 v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells,
790 F. Supp. 576 (E.D.N.C. 1992). All of these cases are discussed at infra notes 275-312 and
accompanying text.
275. Federal Deposit Ins., 967 F.2d at 166.
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pursued complex commercial ventures that were based on unsound underwriting
practices.27 After Woods violated numerous Bank Board regulations, thereby
receiving a Cease and Desist Order, he hired Arthur Young (now Ernst and
Young) to conduct independent audits.'" The audits set Western's net worth
at $41 million, when in reality, Western was insolvent by $100 million.278
The FDIC sued, alleging that Woods had made false entries on Western's books
to defraud depositors and creditors.279
The district court held that neither Woods nor Western relied on the audit
prepared by Arthur Young; therefore, Arthur Young was not liable for Woods'
falsification of the business record.' The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed based on the district court's reasoning." Additionally, the appeals
court rejected Western's argument that Arthur Young's negligently prepared
audit caused the losses, because if the audits had been accurate, a government
regulator or Western's creditor could have saved Western.' The appeals
court reasoned that the argument was inappropriate because Western could not
argue that a third party would have rescued it for something that it was aware
of and chose to ignore. 3
Although the court's holding in Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Ernst
& Young was in favor of the accounting firm, the court warned that the holding
is narrowly applied to the facts of this case. 4  The outcome of Federal
Deposit was dependent upon the plaintiff's misfortune of improperly bringing
suit as the company's assignee. The accounting profession should not broadly
interpret this holding and should scrutinize a case's facts before relying on this
ruling. 2 5 Arthur Young was sued for professional negligence in this case, and
the decision did not exonerate Arthur Young for failing to uncover the fraud.
Suits similar to this, in which the client's internal management and officers have
intentionally committed fraud against the company and the CPA firm has failed
to uncover the fraud, are common. Courts have only recently begun to
276.. Id. at 168.
277. Id.; see also supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
278. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1992).
279. Id. at 169. Wood's intentional false entries caused Western's net worth to be understated.
The FDIC sued as Western's assignee; therefore the suit was brought by its client against its auditor.
Id. The FDIC, bringing suit as Western's assignee, did not have a cause of action because Western
did not have a cause of action. Id. at 171.
280. Federal Deposit, 967 F.2d at 172.
281. Id. at 170-71.
282. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166, 171 (5th Cir. 1992).
283. Id. at 171.
284. Id. at 172.
285. For an opposite opinion regarding Federal Deposit's holding, see Judge Nrxes FDIC Suit
Against E&Y, Acr. TODAY, Oct. 21, 1991, at 1.
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recognize reasonable limits on CPAs' abilities to uncover internal fraud.2 6
In addition to narrowly applying the Restatement standard in negligent
misrepresentation cases, a recent landmark California case reversed that state's
approach to extending accountants' liability in professional negligence cases.28 7
In Bily v. Arthur Young & Company, investors in the Osborne Company brought
suit against Arthur Young alleging fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and
professional negligence. 8  The Bily court held that an auditor owes no
general duty of care to non-clients.' However, auditors may be liable for
negligent misrepresentations in audit reports to persons who act in reliance on
those misrepresentations in a transaction that the auditor intended to
influence.' The Bily court discussed the vagueness of New York's privity
approach"8 and the foreseeability standard, and dismissed both as not
furthering California's policy objectives.' The Bily court ruled that not all
foreseeable third-party users of audit reports will be permitted to sue the auditor
on a theory of professional negligence.'
The Bily court premised its reasoning on three concerns:
(1) Given the secondary "watchdog" role of the auditor, the
complexity of the professional opinions rendered in audit reports, and
the difficult and potentially tenuous causal relationships between audit
reports and economic losses from investment and credit decisions, the
auditor exposed to negligence claims from all foreseeable third parties
faces potential liability far out of proportion to its fault;
(2) The generally more sophisticated class of plaintiffs in auditor
liability cases (e.g., business lenders and investors) permits the
286. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ernst & Young, 967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992). The
financial statements are controlled by a company's management, and CPAs only render an opinion
on management's accounts and records. Not all fraud is detectible. For a further discussion, see
supra notes 36, 39, 40 and accompanying text.
287. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992); see International Mortgage Co.
v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 223 Cal.Rptr. 218, 227 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1986), overruled
by Bily, 834 P.2d at 745. By rejecting the Ultramares standard and adopting the Restatement, the
International court broadened California's negligence law regarding an accountant's liability to third
parties. The court held that "an independent auditor owes a duty of care to reasonably foreseeable
plaintiffs who rely on negligently prepared and issued unqualified audited financial statements."
International Mortgage, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
288. Bily, 834 P.2d at 745-49.
289. Id. at 767.
290. Id. at 768.
291. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 753-55 (Cal. 1992).
292. Id. at 757.
293. Id. at 766-68.
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effective use of contract rather than tort liability to control and adjust
the relevant risks through "private ordering"; and
(3) The asserted advantages of more accurate auditing and more
efficient loss spreading relied upon by those who advocate a pure
foreseeability approach are unlikely to occur; indeed, dislocations of
resources, including increased expense and decreased availability of
auditing services in some sectors of the economy, are more probable
consequences of expanded liability. '
The Bily court further stated that auditors are only watchdogs and not
bloodhounds.' In recognizing the economic and commercial reality that
audits are performed in a "client-controlled environment," the court gave
adequate consideration to the fact that the auditor may not have been aware of
the existence of a third-party transaction that caused the claim.' The Bily
holding reinstates the Restatement standard and applies the privity requirement
to actions asserting a general duty of care owed by the accountant.' The Bily
court narrowly applies the Restatement standard and holds that liability only
attaches when an auditor receives notice that a specific third party would be
given a copy of the audit.? The California court's approach is novel, and the
Bily court's discussion of limiting the application of the Restatement standard
and the necessity of requiring strict privity to hold an accountant liable for a
general duty of care should be seriously considered as a reasonable balance of
the rights of accountants and their clients.'
294. Id. at 762.
295. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 762 (Cal. 1992).
296. Id.
297. Id. at 774.
298. Accountants Not Liable to Investors in Company, LAW. ALERT, Oct. 12, 1992, at 17.
299. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992). In addition to the Bily court's
holding regarding general duty of care and negligence, the court also held that an auditor may be
liable to reasonably foreseeable third parties for intentional fraud in the preparation and
dissemination of an audit. Id. at 747. A 1993 California Court of Appeals decision has ruled that
the application of the Bily case is retroactive. Industrial Indemnity v. Touch, Ross & Co., 17 Cal.
Rptr.2d 29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). In Industrial Indemnity, the California court restated the Bily
holding that an auditor's liability for general negligence regarding an audit of a client's financial
statements was limited to "the client[,] i.e., the person who contracts for or engages the audit
services." ld. at 33. After applying Bily, the Industrial court found that no evidence existed that
the plaintiffs had engaged or contracted for Touche's audit service. Id. The Industrial Indemnity
opinion not only establishes that Bily has retroactive effect on California cases, but in addition, it
gives an excellent summary of the Bily decision and its applicability.
Another 1993 case was recently decided in favor of public accountants. In Brown v. KPMG
Peat Marwick, 856 S.W.2d 742 (rex. Ct. App. 1993), the court affirmed the trial court's summary
judgment ruling in favor of KPMG Peat Marwick, public accountants, and held that the discovery
"rule does not toll limitations in a suit filed against an auditor by a non-client who charges
negligence in the performance of an audit." Id. at 749. In reaching its decision, the Brown court
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Another court, the United States District Court for the Eastern Division of
North Carolina, recently applied a strict interpretation of the Restatement
standard and granted summary judgment in favor of an accounting firm, Deloitte
Haskins & Sells.' In Venturtech M v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, three venture
capital firms invested in a company called Learning Resources, Inc. (LRI). 3"
LRI created and marketed educational audiovisual tapes.' Needing additional
capital, LRI convinced several other venture capitalist firms to invest in its
operations.' After continuously contributing increasingly more capital to
LRI, the venture capitalist firms refused to invest any further in 1988, and LRI's
remaining assets were sold.'
In an attempt to recoup its investment losses, the venture capitalists sued
Deloitte Haskins & Sells (DH&S), alleging LRI's 1982 through 1986 financial
statements contained material misrepresentations.3 5 in determining whether
plaintiffs were intended third-party beneficiaries of the LRI-Deloitte audit
engagement, the court looked at the circumstances surrounding Deloitte's
accounting services, as a written contract between LRI and Deloitte was non-
existent.'3 6 The court found that general factors such as "the primary purpose
of an audit, the usual reliance of investors on audited financial statements,
DH&S's status as an international accounting firm, and the application of
national standards" was "too generic to support a finding that LRI and DH&S
intended these plaintiffs to benefit from their contract."" In reference to its
findings, the court stated, "A finding to the contrary would make every venture
capital investor an intended beneficiary of every auditing engagement between
an accounting firm and its client. It is to prevent such expansive liability from
attaching solely on the basis of generalities that strict construction against the
party seeking enforcement is required."' The Venturtech court found, with
the exception of the 1982 financial report, that no evidence existed showing that
Deloitte knew that the venture capitalist investors would use its financial
statements. 3°9 Based on its evidentiary findings, the Venturtech court held that
the plaintiffs were not intended third-party beneficiaries of Deloitte's and LRI's
applied the Restatement standard and used the Bily and Ultramares decisions as support for its
findings. Id. at 747-49.
300. Venturtech 11 v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 790 F. Supp. 576 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
301. Id. at 580.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Venturtech II v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 790 F. Supp. 576, 580 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
305. Id. at 579.
306. Id. at 582.
307. Id. at 583.
308. Venturtech 11 v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 790 F. Supp. 576, 583 (E.D.N.C. 1992).
309. Id. at 583.
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audit engagement."'
After applying the Restatement standard, the Venturtech court also
concluded that Deloitte's knowledge that venture capitalists invested in LRI in
the past, and that those investors generally rely on financial statements, was
insufficient to establish that Deloitte owed a duty to the investors and held that
the investors could not state a claim for negligent misrepresentation.3" The
Venturtech court also granted Deloitte summary judgment on the claims of
common law fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and state securities law
violations."
In addition to courts narrowly applying the Restatement standard, public
accountants may now receive liability protection under some states' application
of contributory negligence.3"3 After its employee admitted to embezzlement,
Howard Street Jewelers sued its CPA, Mr. Wegad, for professional
malpractice.3"4 Although Wegad's engagement letter specifically limited the
scope of service he was to provide Howard Street Jewelers, Wegad did inform
Howard Street when he discovered that someone was stealing from the
business.3"5 In deciding whether defective jury instructions were given on
contributory negligence, the Maryland Court of Appeals reiterated that a defense
for contributory negligence is based on "whether the plaintiff took appropriate
precautions to protect his own interests. "316 The court further stated, "The
client. . . should not be permitted an absolute and unqualified right to rely on
the accountant's advice and thereby be completely insulated from responsibility
for his or her own shortcomings."31 7
In deciding whether a client was contributorily negligent, the Maryland
court applied the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 552A, which provides,
"The recipient of a negligent misrepresentation is barred from recovery for
pecuniary loss suffered in reliance upon it if he is negligent in so relying. "318
The Maryland court found that Howard Street admitted that an accountant may
310. Id.
311. Id. at 585.
312. Id. at 587-89.
313. Wegad v. Howard Street Jewelers, 605 A.2d 123 (Md. 1992).
314. Id. at 125.
315. Mr. Wegad's annual engagement letter to Howard Street stated that Wegad's services "did
not include an audit and would 'not be designed and cannot be relied upon to disclose fraud,
defalcations or other irregularities.'" Id. at 127. However, the letter also stated that Wegad would
inform Howard Street "'of any matters that come to our attention which cause us to believe that the
information furnished us is not correct.'" Id. at 127 n.3.
316. Id. at 128.
317. Id.
318. Wegad v. Howard Street Jewelers, 605 A.2d 123, 128 (Md. 1992).
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not always be in a better position to "appreciate the risk."31 9 The court
further stated, "[T]he client cannot always discharge the duty to protect itself
merely by relying on an accountant's advice. Rather, a client's reliance on its
accountant must be reasonable." 32 After restating the Maryland courts'
standard for determining the existence of contributory negligence in public
accounting cases, the court held that the lower court judge did not err in his jury
instructions and that upon remand, judgment in favor of Wegad would be
reinstated. 321
C. SEC Cases-Court Limitations On Accountants' Liability
Another court recently re-examined its state's liability laws as applied in
public accounting cases. In SEC v. Price Waterhouse, a federal district court
in New York dismissed a suit that the Securities and Exchange Commission
brought against Price Waterhouse, alleging both primary violations and aiding
and abetting violations of the Securities and Exchange Act.322 In Price
Waterhouse, Price Waterhouse conducted audits for the fiscal year ending July
31, 1980, of AM International (AMI), a producer of business equipment.32
In 1976, after a new CEO was hired by AMI, the company began to
purchase other business equipment companies. 3" However, the earnings of
AMI declined, and the costs of the newly purchased companies increased;
therefore, a planned public offering was to take place in 1980. 311 This
offering did not occur because of the reactions of the company's investment
advisors to the 1980 financial statements. 3' Although the statements showed
a decline from the previous year, AMI's management stated in its annual report
that despite the overall decline, there were quarter-to-quarter improvements. 327
AMI replaced its CEO and hired Arthur Andersen to review the 1980 audit.3"
Arthur Andersen indicated that the 1980 audit report was absent entries, and
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 130. The court appeared to shift some of the responsibility of running a business
back on the owner when it stated,
While businesses may rely on an accountant's advice and need not carry out the
functions that the accountant is employed to perform, the fact that an accountant has not
discovered or disclosed employee theft does not completely excuse the employer from
taking reasonable measures and exercising reasonable vigilance to prevent theft.
Id.
322. SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. 1217, 1244 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
323. Id. at 1221.
324. Id. at 1219.
325. Id.
326. SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. 1217, 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
327. Id. at 1219-20.
328. Id. at 1220.
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Price Waterhouse was replaced by Arthur Andersen.3" AMI subsequently
filed for bankruptcy.
3 °
The Price Waterhouse court denied the SEC's request for an injunction
because the SEC had failed to prove both the necessary elements for a securities
fraud violation and the aiding and abetting violations. 331 The court discussed
the necessary elements of liability for violations of the Securities Act: "a
misrepresentation or omission of a material fact, made with scienter and made
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities." The court then restated
the definitions of the terms scienter332 and recklessness 333 and determined
that recklessness satisfies the requirement of scienter. 31 Establishing that the
standard requires more than a misapplication of accounting principles, the court
stated that the SEC had to prove that Price Waterhouse's accounting principles
were so deficient that the audit, in effect, was not an audit at all, or that the
accounting judgments were such that no reasonable accountant would have made
the same decision if confronted with identical facts.
335
Using this heightened standard, the court concluded that the SEC failed to
prove the requisite scienter and therefore, had failed to prove that Price
Waterhouse violated the Securities and Exchange Act.31 In reaching this
conclusion, the Price Waterhouse court rejected the SEC's argument that Price
Waterhouse's concern for retaining its client and its fees implies fraud. 337 The
court concluded, "It is highly improbable that an accountant would risk
surrendering a valuable reputation for honesty and careful work by participating
in a fraud merely to obtain increased fees."
338
329. Id.
330. SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. 1217, 1220 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
331. Id. at 1243.
332. Id. at 1240.' Scienter is the "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 185 (1976).
333. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. at 1240. "IRlecklessness" was defined by the court in
a securities fraud action against an accountant as highly unreasonable conduct that requires an
extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, not just simple or inexcusable negligence,
and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers, known to the defendant or so obvious
that the actor must have been aware. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 185.
334. SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. 1217, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
335. Id.
336. Id. at 1240-41.
337. Id. at 1242.
338. SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. 1217, 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); see also DiLeo v.
Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 941 (1990). In reaching its
conclusion that the SEC had failed to prove its allegations of aiding and abetting violations, the Price
Waterhouse court reasoned that the necessary element of scienter was absent. The court further
stated that even if the violations had existed, the SEC had failed to demonstrate the need for
injunctive relief. The test for injunctive relief as stated by the court is, "whether the defendant's
past conduct indicates that there is a reasonable likelihood of further violation in the future." Price
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The Price Waterhouse opinion demonstrates how courts are just now
beginning to carefully review and analyze the facts, and apply sound policy
judgments when deciding complicated cases alleging SEC violations. This case
emphasizes the seriousness of securities violation allegations and the need for
courts to place strict requirements on the SEC to make the necessary evidentiary
proofs to maintain an action. 3 9
VII. PROPOSED REFORM
The problems associated with the expansion of accountants' liability to third
parties could be eliminated if states adopt a specific statute that governs those
public accounting cases brought under common law actions of civil fraud and
negligence. The current proposed federal legislation regarding SEC 10b-5 and
RICO suits is long overdue; however, its scope of application is limited to those.
specific violations. This legislation does not address the vast majority of suits
against accountants because most suits are brought under the common law
actions of fraud and negligence.3 °
However necessary the proposed federal legislation is, many of the
accountants' collateral concerns will still not be addressed. One concern in
particular is the large number of out-of-court settlements for vexatious or
Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. at 1243; see also SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d 938, 943 (2d Cir.
1979).
339. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp. at 1243.
Despite strong support from several major corporations' CEOs and presidents, the accounting
profession's proposed changes in the current securities regulations were not well received by federal
securities regulators. Testimony was heard before the Senate Banking Committee and subcommittee
on securities in the summer of 1993. EMC's corporate chairman testified that the threat of SEC
suits forces many corporations to "constantly think short-term in order to deliver acceptable financial
results every 90 days, rather than focusing on the long-term development of technologies and
processes." Ken Rankin, War on Abusive Lawsuits Meets Capitol Opponents, ACCT. TODAY, July
19, 1993, at 2, 34. EMC's chairman contended that the constant threat of suit puts U.S.
corporations at a disadvantage because their foreign competitors do not have to worry about such
suits.
Supporting the EMC chairman's position, the ADAPTEC's president stated that "there is not
a CEO in the Silicon Valley or any other high technology area who does not dread these capricious,
abusive suits." Id. However, despite corporate support, many others disagree with the accounting
profession's attempts to change securities regulations in order to reduce abusive securities suits. Joel
Seligman, a University of Michigan law professor, stated, "IThere is little objective data at this time
that suggests there is a need for significant reform of the Federal securities law." Id. Seligman
blamed "some of the litigation 'crisis' that (CPAs) seek to correct" on failed auditing and accounting
practices. Id.
340. The federal legislation will only impact Rule lOb-5 security suits, and state legislation is
mostly designed to decrease the amount of damages that the accountant will have to pay. ANDERSEN
Er AL., supra note 1, at 2, 3. For a view opposing the proposed federal legislation, see Melvyn I.
Weiss, Auditors, Public Both Need Tough Liability Rules, AcCT. TODAY, Jan. 24, 1994, at 9.
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frivolous suits. These out-of-court settlements result in the accounting firms
paying huge amounts for unwarranted and unfounded claims.' These
disproportionate out-of-court settlements ultimately affect the price that
accounting firms will charge for services, and in return, this will affect the
national economy. 2'
For example, the S&L failure has currently produced an onslaught of out-
of-court settlements by many defendants, including CPAs, lawyers, and
bankers.4 3  Two major reasons for the large numbers of out-of-court
settlements surrounding the S&L crisis are cost and reputation. It is no longer
cost effective for many CPAs, especially those involved in technical suits such
as SEC suits, to defend themselves in court.' For example, a CPA may
receive $20,000 in fees for an audit, yet defending the opinions in that audit may
cost thousands more than the audit work itself was ever worth. Legal and court
costs also contribute to the large numbers of out-of-court settlements.' Out-
of-court settlements are also more frequent in S&L failure suits because of the
defendants' concern for their reputations. Any association with, for example,
Charles Keating or his cohorts is detrimental to the health of any financial
institution. With the widespread national exposure of the S&L failure,
defendants are trying to distance themselves as quickly as possible from the
event and those associated with it.346
341. E.g., U.S. Nat'l Bank v. Miniscribe, No. 89-CV-1031-A (rex. Dist. Ct., Galveston Co.
1992); Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse, No. 88-34414 (Ariz. Super. Ct., Maricopa
Co. 1992).
Although not a public accounting case, Greenfield v. U.S. Healthcare, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8982 (E.D. Pa., July 6, 1993) may effectively help reduce the number of strike suits brought against
public accountants. The Greenfield decision demonstrated that when enough evidence exists, courts
are now applying Rule 11 sanctions against attorneys for filing baseless suits. In Greenfield, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania applied Rule 11 sanctions
against a law firm when the firm, relying only on a Wall Street Journal article, asked a client to be
a plaintiff in a class action suit. After realizing that he had a conflict of interest and could not verify
the complaint, the client requested that the firm withdraw the complaint. The defendant brought
Rule 11 sanctions against the law firm, and the court held that the firm violated Rule 11. In making
its decision, the court stated that it had not seen any evidence "to suggest that Malone will be
deterred from future conduct in the violation of Rule 11." Id. at *24. For a summary of the case,
see Plaintiffs' Sanction in Shareholder Lawsuit, J. ACCT., June 1993, at 21.
342. Scapegoat Litigation Drains U.S. Economy, Study Asserts, J. ACCT., Oct. 1992, at 20.
343. Cushman, supra note 3, at Al; Schmidt, supra note 3, at Al. "Economically, in the
1980s many high-flying ventures, including thrifts, crashed and burned, with their managements'
professional advisers as the only solvent-and sometimes only un-indicted-parties left standing
when investors, government regulators and bank loan officers arrived on the scene." Gail Diane
Cox, Unlimited Liability, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 21, 1992, at I.
344. See generally ANDERSEN ET AL., supra note I; AUS Consultants, supra note 3.
345. Schmidt, supra note 3, at Al.
346. See supra note 343. For a discussion of Charles Keating and the S&L crisis, see supra
note 43.
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Reputation and cost are also the two largest factors in CPAs settling out of
court in cases outside the S&L failure. Self-preservation, either economically
or in appearance, is necessary to be a national and world competitor.
Accounting firms are no different than other business professions and must
weigh cost factors and the detrimental effects of lawsuits on the firms'
reputations in deciding whether to actively defend themselves. Plaintiffs
recognize these economic and reputation factors and will use these factors as a
benefit when filing questionable suits. This practice must be stopped. These
frivolous or unwarranted suits affect not only the parties involved, but the
national economy and the consumer as well." 7
The only way to reduce the number of suits being brought is to effectively
limit the expansion of liability to accountants in public accounting suits. The
California Supreme Court's holding in Bily v. Arthur Young & Company s is
a fair ruling for both the accountant and the non-client third party. The Bily
court endorsed the privity requirement for cases brought under professional
negligence and the Restatement standard for negligent misrepresentation."
This approach takes public policy into consideration, without allowing the policy
to dictate the result.
A few states have proposed legislation that will help end the third-party
liability problem in accounting cases.3" However, this legislation concentrates
347. See supra note 342.
The American Tort Reform Association's recent study of the S&L failure has produced the
following results:
- 224,000 jobs a year between 1992 and 1996 will be lost,
- The federal budget deficit will increase by an average of $3.7 billion a year,
- State and local government surpluses will be cut approximately $1.2 billion a year,
- The real output in manufacturing will be reduced by $6.9 billion a year.
AUS Consultants, supra note 3, at iii, 11, 12.
348. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
349. Id. at 774.
350. Survey Shows Extent of Members' Concern Over Legal Liability, supra note 256, at 1.
Illinois is one state that has passed legislation which requires the existence of privity between an
accountant and a third-party before a third-party can bring a tort action against the accountant. The
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, recently applied section
30.1 of the Illinois Public Accounting Act in Robin v. Falbo, No. 91 C 2894, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11075 (N.D. Ill., July 23, 1992), and dismissed a third-party negligence action brought
against a public accounting firm. The Illinois Public Accounting Act states that "no person,
partnership or corporation licensed to practice public accountancy under the Act shall be liable for
civil damages to person not in privity of contract." 225 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 450/30.1 (West 1993),
formerly ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 11, para. 5535.1 (1991). In applying the Act, the court also stated,
"It is not the function of this court to comment on the sensibility of the statutes or the legislative
workings which preceded its passage." Robin, No. 91 C 2894, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11075, at
*25. The court also dismissed securities law claims and RICO claims brought against the public
accountants. Robin, No. 91 C 2894, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11075, at *4. For a brief analysis of
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on applying a rule of comparative negligence in public accounting cases.
3 51
Although the premise behind these proposals is valid, these laws appear to only
treat a symptom of a much larger problem. As opposed to treating the
symptoms of the problem, it is far more effective to treat the problem itself. A
proposed model state statute that addresses the common law actions of civil
fraud, professional negligence, and negligent misrepresentation would cure the
problem. This model state statute could serve as a guide to future state
legislation, or it could be adopted without change by the states. The proposed
statute alleviates the uncertainty surrounding third-party liability in public
accounting cases for the courts, the juries, and the parties involved. This statute
directly addresses the problems of expanding third-party liability in public
accounting cases. Therefore, state statutes regarding the application of
comparative negligence in public accounting cases would not be needed.
The proposed statute is based on the premises that engagement letters are
valid written contracts that establish a legal relationship between the parties who
enter into the agreement and that opinion letters are merely opinions and not
express warranties. The statute is not meant to be adopted at the federal level
because this is particularly a state problem. Recognition and respect for states'
autonomy and federalism concerns require that this statute be adopted at the state
level of government.
LEGAL LIABILrrY oF ACCOUNTANTS
Section 101. Definitions
As used in this statute, the term-
Party refers to any person, corporation, or entity either
collectively or singly, who brings a lawsuit against an
accountant.
Accountant refers to any persons, corporations, partnerships, sole
proprietorships, or entities who hold themselves out to
be an expert in accounting theory and practice.
Included as accountants are certified public accountants
(CPAs) who have been licensed either by the AICPA or
an equivalent state professional licensing board.
the case and its impact on the accounting profession, see Coun Dismisses Securities Claim, J.
ACCT., Sept. 1993, at 28.
351. Id.












is defined as intentional or unintentional conduct by any
person(s), who holds himself or herself as having the
knowledge, training, and skill of an ordinary member
of that person's profession in good standing, which fails
to be consistent with the conduct of a person who is in
good standing in that profession.
refers to a contractual relationship between two parties.
refers to any party not in strict privity with the
accountant.
refers to a form of deceit which occurs when a party
makes false statements, honestly believing their
veracity, but without reasonable grounds for that belief.
A party's representation is treated as a material fact if
that party communicates either directly or indirectly that
it possesses superior knowledge or special information
or expertise regarding the subject matter, and the
plaintiff is in a position to reasonably rely on the
party's proposed knowledge, information, or expertise.
refers to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552. In
applying the Restatement § 552, the definition of the
class of persons who an accountant is liable to is limited
to those for whose benefit and guidance the accountant
intends to supply the information or knows that the
recipient of the information intends to supply it, and
through the reliance on the information in a transaction
that the accountant intends the information to influence
or knows that the recipient of the information so
intends. The accountant must know with substantial
certainty that a person or class of persons will rely on
the representation in the course of the transaction.
is defined according to the common law principles of
fraud, and is distinguished as used in this statute from
criminal fraud.
1994] 1107
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Section 102. Professional Negligence
A party suing an accountant alleging professional negligence is required to be
in strict privity with that accountant. If the party is not in strict privity with that
accountant, then the party will not be deemed by the court to have standing to
sue that accountant.
Section 103. Negligent Misrepresentation
When a third-party plaintiff or client sues an accountant alleging negligent
misrepresentation, the court shall apply the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552
to determine the accountant's liability to that third party or client regarding the
specified negligent misrepresentation.
Section 104. Privity Requirement
A party plaintiff is required to be in strict privity with an accountant before that
party can bring an action alleging civil fraud against that accountant. When
considering an action of civil fraud brought against an accountant, the court shall
consider and balance the following factors when determining the accountant's
liability as to the alleged fraudulent conduct:
(a) The plaintiff's business background, including reputation and
experience. The court can apply either local, regional, or national
standards in reviewing the factors in this sub-section.
(b) Whether the plaintiff's actions, either passively or actively, were a
deliberate attempt to perpetrate fraudulent actions of a financial nature.
(c) A plaintiff's degree of control over its internal accounting structure and
management.
(d) If the alleged fraud concerns an audit, the speculative nature of the
audit, and the processes used to interpret the financial statements and
internal accounting structure.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The expansion of third-party liability in public accounting cases can best be
alleviated by states adopting a uniform standard that applies the strict privity
requirement in professional negligent cases, and the Restatement standard in
negligent misrepresentation cases. In applying these standards, the courts should
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also keep in mind the specific policy objectives set forth in Bily.352 If states
implement the proposed model statute, the need for legislation directed at
replacing joint and several liability with comparative negligence in public
accounting cases will be unnecessary.
The proposed statute will provide for equitable results in public accounting
cases. In addition, the model state statute will give courts, juries, and parties
a consistent standard to apply and rely on in public accounting cases. The
provision of a consistent liability standard will effectively stop courts' expansion
of third-party liability in public accounting cases. With the courts no longer
expanding third-party liability in public accounting suits, the accounting
profession will have a fair chance of surviving the liability storm, and the
negative impact of accountants' third-party liability on the national and global
economies will be alleviated.
Julie FaussiC
352. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
* This note is dedicated to Mr. Michael J. Crandall, an honorable member of the CPA
profession. Many Thanks!
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